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ABSTRACT
The geostrategic environment since the end of the Cold War has drastically changed the way
United States (U.S.) policymakers develop strategies to combat a wide range of hostile threats
facing the country, especially in the field of the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs). Iran is such an actor, who poses one of the greater proliferation threats in the world
and continues to commit hostile actions in the Middle East. In this post-Cold War environment,
it is imperative that the United States develop a tailored deterrence strategy to meet this
challenge. Past deterrence strategies popular during the bipolar era of the Cold War focused on
the idea of a “rational actor,” one in which an adversary theoretically would similarly make
decisions to how U.S. leadership thinks about the values of a cost-benefit analysis of any
strategic action. However, with the emergence of new and asymmetric threats, it has become
apparent that not all actors in the world think in the same way as U.S. leaders. Starting in the
Cold War era, the concept of strategic culture emerged, which sought to understand the cultural
drivers behind state behavior. Strategic culture is a field of research which gives insight into
another culture, and how their values, norms, and perceptions shape the way that they view
rational decision making on a cost-benefit analysis. This field of study can provide explanations
for decisions that others might make; how/when to go to war, what constitutes the rationality to
pursue or use WMDs, and what values they hold which are exploitable. By using strategic
culture as a tool to tailor a deterrence strategy, the United States will be better able to formulate
policy to contain, deter, and defeat adversaries. This report will use the Islamic Republic of Iran
as a case study to present its threat to U.S. strategic objectives, explain how strategic culture can
be used to understand threats from Iran, and then assess its strategic culture to use in the
formulation of a tailored deterrence policy against the Islamic Republic.

KEYWORDS: strategic culture, taqiyya, intercontinental ballistic missile, deterrence, Kahn,
Schelling, terrorism, WMD, nuclear, proliferation
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CULTURE: A POLICY BLUEPRINT
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you
know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”
Sun Tzu – The Art of War

The above quote by the famed ancient Chinese general, military strategist, and
philosopher Sun Tzu offers counsel to anyone reading and studying his works of the importance
of culture when deciding military and diplomatic policy. Throughout history and conflict, wars
have been waged, and battles have been miscalculated due to the misperceptions of adversaries.
How an opponent acts or reacts is based on the deep-seated cultural values, norms, and
perceptions which dominate their strategic thinking.
During the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides described in the Melian Dialogue how
Athens approached the neutral nation-state of Melos with a vastly superior army and demanded
that the Melians either pay fealty and tribute, or face annihilation. Athens was shocked when the
Melians refused this ultimatum, as they believed that Melos would capitulate under such
circumstances. However, the Melians based their strategic decision upon their belief that the
Gods would favor their cause because of their perception that they were morally in the right.1 As
a result, the Athenians besieged the island of Melos, and quickly routed their armies, executing
the adult men and selling the women and children into slavery.
Even though a lack of insight into Melian strategic thinking caught the Athenians offguard, they still had the necessary military power to come out of the situation victorious and
relatively unscathed. This is an important example of how an opponent will not always act in a
1

Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue (416 B.C.), V.84-116,
http://lygdamus.com/resources/New%20PDFS/Melian.pdf.
1

predictable manner, even if conventional wisdom (as understood by the Athenians) seems to
dictate a particular course of action and outcome. A lack of understanding of an opponent’s
culture and their basis for decision-making caused strategic miscalculation. While there are
countless examples of states being strategically surprised by the actions of others as a result of
differing cultures, belief systems, or frames of reference, it is imperative to understand why this
occurs so that U.S. policy, planning, and national interests can be best served.
This paper will attempt to:

•
•
•
•
•

Describe the current threat emanating from Iran;
Make a case for a new and tailored deterrence policy, by first recounting the evolution of
traditional deterrence policy, and discounting the fallacies associated with it;
Introduce the examination of strategic culture as a tool which can provide insight into Iran’s
strategic decision-making process;
Analyze Iran’s strategic culture, including their norms, values and identity as developed
through its history and experience; and,
Offer suggestions as to how Iran’s strategic culture can play a role in assisting the
formulation of a tailored U.S. deterrence strategy towards that nation.

Iran is currently a hostile actor vying for dominance in the Middle East. A long history of
painful experiences such as foreign intervention and covert actions, suppression of dissent,
coups, revolutions, proxy conflict, economic sanctions, and terrorism has cemented an animosity
in its elite towards the United States and the west. Complicating matters, the United States does
not have a history of trust towards the Islamic Republic and its nuclear ambitions because Iran
has an extensive record of cheating on nuclear deals it has made. Due to a long history of secret
nuclear development, flaws within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), and the
U.S. withdrawal from the J.C.P.O.A., this animosity has been exacerbated.

2

As an aggressive actor attempting to expand its influence within the region, Iran has
sought to enhance its military capabilities. These advances can be seen in currently possessed
and potentially attainable systems, such as guided weaponry, warhead miniaturization, offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities, expansion of its missile arsenal, and area-denial proficiencies.
Furthermore, Iran’s record of utilizing terrorist proxies to achieve strategic objectives causes
further concern for U.S. and allied leadership.2 If Iran were to successfully develop or acquire a
nuclear weapon, there would be a risk of proliferation in the Middle East that might prove to be
irreversible.
To understand how to develop a tailored approach to address this threat, it is essential for
one to know the evolution of U.S. deterrence strategy. Since the first usage of atomic bombs on
the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, intellectuals like Bernard Brodie made a case for a
deterrence theory which would prevent a nuclear war from destroying the planet. In the period
that followed, two theorists became the leaders in this debate, Herman Kahn and Thomas
Schelling. They came to very different conclusions as to how deterrence is most likely to be
credible and provide stability. In the end, the United States adopted a hybrid strategy which
combined the two theories, with more emphasis on Schelling’s limitations of defense forces.
However, neither Schelling nor Kahn’s theories took into account the full range of threats that
evolved in the post-Cold War environment, most notably the variety of actors that would emerge
(each with their unique perspective on what they consider to be rational actions). Fallacies
associated with Cold War deterrence theories made it clear that a new framework needs to be

2

Daniel Byman, “Proxy Power: Understanding Iran’s Use of Terrorism,” Brookings
Institute, July 26, 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/proxy-power-understanding-iransuse-of-terrorism/.
3

established, one in which cultural attitudes and decision-making processes of certain leaders
would need to be considered in order to tailor specific strategies on a case-by-case basis.
The study of strategic culture arose during the Cold War and would seek to fill the gaps
in U.S. leader’s understanding of how other world leaders might act in response to cultural
norms and biases embedded within their psyche. Strategic culture can be used as a model to
serve as a tool to tailoring deterrence strategies. Strategic culture is defined by Harvard professor
and expert on Strategic Culture Alastair Iain Johnston as, “an integrated system of symbols…
that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences.”3 These strategic
preferences can include such things as negotiating styles, modes of behavior, necessity to acquire
or proliferate weapons of mass destruction, and decisions of when to initiate conflict. Factors
such as geography, historical experiences, fears, and myths and symbols play a role in
formulating a state’s specific strategic culture. The difficulty of tailoring U.S. deterrence policy
towards both state and non-state actors is that their intentions can be unclear. Strategic culture
seeks to explain how elite confirmation of culturally-endorsed outcomes plays a role in the
decision-making process, and how states often justify actions regarding WMDs in cultural terms.
To analyze Iran’s strategic culture, one must first look at factors such as the background
of Iran from its ancient past to the present and how history explains cultural phenomena such as
the creation of a caste system, fear of conquerors, and clerical involvement in its decisionmaking process. Iran’s identity must also be studied, including how it views the concept of “us
versus them,” Shi’a influence on society, as well as the existential threats currently facing the
nation. Thirdly, quantifiable Iranian values such as power distance, individualism, masculinity,
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence will further explain the factors that
3

Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 32-64.
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shape Iranian strategic culture. Iranian norms must also be understood, to help explain what
influences drives its actions in the international arena, noting certain cultural orientations such as
honor, pragmatism, and pessimism. Finally, the degree to which Iran adheres to international
norms, acquires, transfers/proliferates, and uses WMDs must be observed using a strategic
culture framework. By taking these factors into account, one will be better able to develop and
tailor a deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Iran using strategic culture as a tool.

5

THE IRANIAN THREAT
“We must combat the plans of the arrogance [i.e. the West, led by the U.S.] with jihad for the
sake of Allah. Jihad for the sake of God does not only mean military conflict, but also means
cultural, economic, and political struggle... The planning for the struggle against them should
include both defense and offense. The power-hungry order led by the United States of America is
the perfectly clear embodiment of 'the concept of the enemy.' America has no human morality. It
carries out evil crimes under the guise of flowery statements and smiles... The U.S. has aspired
for decades to infiltrate the region and regain its lost reputation. The Americans wish to
infiltrate Iran with the [J.C.P.O.A.] agreement, whose fate in Iran and in the U.S. is still
unknown. But we have decisively blocked this path, and we will do anything to keep them from
infiltrating Iran economically, politically, and culturally.”4
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – Speech at the Iranian Shi’a Ahl Al-Bayt Organization
Conference, August 15th, 2015

Iran presents one of the most serious current security challenges to the United States. A
history of mistrust and animosity between the two countries has led to a situation that could erupt
into conflict and violence at any point. Furthermore, Iran’s past behavior of cheating on arms
control and nuclear agreements is a cause of grave concern among U.S. and global leaders,
especially due to the concessions made to Iran under the J.C.P.O.A. In addition to the skepticism
among those who believe Iran is still hedging its bets on a nuclear future, an existent, clear
evolution of Iranian weapons capabilities may indicate that these causes for concern are coming
to fruition.
If Iran developed a nuclear weapon or any other powerful WMD, there is a distinct
possibility that other countries in the region would also seek a similar capability. This cascade of
nuclear proliferation would undoubtedly transform the world’s nuclear balance and would

4

“Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei In Mid-August 2015: 'The U.S. is the Perfectly
Clear Embodiment Of The Concept Of The Enemy'; 'We Must Combat The Plans Of The
Arrogance With Jihad For The Sake Of Allah,'” Memri Reports, September 1, 2015,
https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-supreme-leader-khamenei-mid-august-2015-us-perfectlyclear-embodiment-concept-enemy#_edn1.
6

greatly complicate U.S. and its allies’ presence in the region. Additionally, Iran has a history of
supporting proxy terrorist groups to advance its ideological cause and give it an asymmetrical
global reach, which causes further instability.

Iranian Animosity Towards the United States
While a long history of invasion and coercion from outside powers has led to an Iranian
strategic culture that is wary of foreigners, the modern Iranian animosity towards the United
States specifically began in 1953 with the ousting of the Iranian Prime Minister Muhamad
Mossadegh though a U.S.-British devised coup, which restored the Persian monarchy and placed
pro-western Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in power. Known as Operation Ajax, this coup was
devised to reverse the effects of Prime Minister Mossadegh’s nationalism of the Iranian oil
industry, a move favored by western powers who had previously controlled the natural oil
resources in the region.5 While promoting policies from which the western powers benefitted, the
Shah was an aggressive authoritarian autocrat who subjugated the Iranian citizenry, leading to a
growing citizen resentment over the next two decades.
This resentment came to a boil in 1979 in what became the Islamic Revolution of Iran,
when demonstrators deposed the Shah and appointed exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
as the Supreme Leader. Along with revolutionary attitudes to impose regime change, the
revolution also rejected the notion of the insertion of Americanism into Iranian culture.6 A
deeper crisis then ensued when student demonstrators broke into the American embassy and held
5

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of an Iranian
Coup,” Foreign Policy, June 20, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-ciafinally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/.
6

Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic (Oxford
University Press, 2014), 81.
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U.S. diplomats hostage for over a year. Anti-American sentiment was a useful tool to focus the
anger of the Iranian populace, consolidate the revolution, and was engrained in the psyche of
both the Iranian leadership and the common people.
The Iranians became further incensed against the United States and the international
order during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980, in which Saddam Hussein sought to seize the
southwestern Iranian province of Khuzestan (an area bordered by Kuwait and the Persian Gulf)
hoping to take control of the land held by a primarily Sunni population.7 During the war, Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran, which led Iran to begin to distrust the international
community’s ability to contain treaties.8 The suffering from these attacks led to Iran’s future
exploration of its chem-bio program, though it was initially rejected as being against Iran’s
Islamic beliefs.
Iran’s animosity towards the U.S. was exacerbated by the U.S. commitment of its navy to
the Persian Gulf to protect shipping and smaller oil-producing Sunni Arab states, such as Kuwait
and the United Arab Emirates.9 During this tension, the United States also accidentally shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner killing all 290 passengers.10 This accident further sustained
hatred of the U.S. from inside Iran.

7

John Stoessinger, Why Nations go to War, Tenth Edition (Nelson Education, 2010),

294.
8

Kerry Kartchner, “Strategic Culture and WMD Decision Making,” In Strategic Culture
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National
Security Policymaking, ed. Jeannie Johnson, Kerry Kartchner, and Jeffrey Larsen, (Springer,
2009), 59.
9

Stoessinger, Why Nations go to War, 294.

10

Stoessinger, 294.
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Within this ongoing conflict, the idea of martyrdom, or sacrificing oneself for a cause,
was prevalent. Iranian soldiers who died in battle would elevate their families’ standing in
society. Martyrdom was so widely accepted that the Iranian clergy would even recruit teenagers
with special permission from Ayatollah Khomeini to enter heaven if they were to die.11 This idea
of martyrdom played an integral part in extending the Iran-Iraq war for eight years.
In 1996, the U.S. government, under the administration President Bill Clinton, imposed
sanctions against Iran, citing them as the world’s most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism.12
The sanctions came in response to Iran’s nuclear program and direct support for terrorist groups
such as Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah.
In 2010, Iran became further infuriated when the United States, in cooperation with
Israel, developed and launched a cyber-attack called Stuxnet, which was created to delay the
Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons.13 The virus destroyed nearly one fifth of the
centrifuges in the Iranian’s Natanz nuclear power plant.
Because of the tense history of conflict with and meddling by western powers, and the
need for a scapegoat for all manner of internal ills, Iran considers the United States to be one of
its foremost adversaries. As Iran continues to increase its power and influence in the region, it
also seeks to minimize U.S. power. It is vital for the United States to recognize Iran as one of the

11

Stoessinger, 294.

12

Alison Mitchell, “Clinton Signs Bill Against Investing in Iran and Libya,” The New
York Times, August 6, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/06/world/clinton-signs-billagainst-investing-in-iran-and-libya.html.
13

Josh Fruhlinger, “What is Stuxnet, Who Created it and How Does it Work?,” CSO
Online, 2019, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3218104/malware/what-is-stuxnet-whocreated-it-and-how-does-it-work.html.
9

most dangerous and unpredictable strategic adversaries in the region, and to focus its military,
economic and diplomatic resources to contain and combat this threat.

Iranian Record of Cheating on International Agreements
In 1970, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.). This treaty allows
countries to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology if they adhere to certain safeguards
and limitations. Since then, Iran’s intentions regarding the uses of nuclear energy has fluctuated.
In 1987, it was discovered that Iran began to meet and cooperate with the AQ Khan proliferation
network and receive transfers of nuclear technology. This included “over 2000 components and
sub-assemblies for P-1 centrifuges, as well as components of P-2 centrifuges, which enrich
uranium faster than P-1 centrifuges.”14
The next major instance of Iranian proliferation action occurred in 2002, when the
political wing of the anti-Iranian terrorist group Mujahideen-e Khalq revealed that Iran had been
building secret nuclear facilities not known to the United Nations.15 These facilities included a
uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a heavy water plant at Arak, which the United States
characterized as “an across the board pursuit of WMDs.”16 The discovery of this facility, and
Iran’s refusal to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) inspectors,
eventually forced Iran in 2004 to acknowledge its activities and promise to suspend uranium
enrichment. In 2005, the I.A.E.A. determined (by a vote of 22-1) that Iran had broken its

14

Jeffery DeIviscio et al., “Iran, the United States and a Political Seesaw,” The New York
Times, 2012, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/04/07/world/
middleeast/iran-timeline.html#/#time5_227.
15

DeIviscio, “Iran, Seesaw.”

16

DeIviscio, “Iran, Seesaw.”
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promise and was not in compliance with the safeguards agreement.17 In 2006, Iran was referred
to the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and had additional protocols levied. That year,
Iran nevertheless ceased to adhere to the protocols and other non-binding inspection procedures,
and overtly admitted for the first time that it had enriched uranium.18
In 2009, the United States, France, and Britain released a statement that Iran had been
constructing a secret nuclear power plant near the holy city of Qom.19 This announcement was
made days after Iran informed the I.A.E.A. of this plant’s existence, and was thought by U.S.
intelligence agencies to be a desperate move because the Iranians had determined that the U.S.
was going to reveal their discovery of the facility.20 Then, in 2011, the I.A.E.A. released a report
detailing an organized effort before 2004 to develop a nuclear weapon.21 The next three years
entailed increasing sanctions and negotiations until finally a deal was signed with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.22
The J.C.P.O.A. is a 159-page agreement that limits Iranian sensitive nuclear activities and
compels cooperation with I.A.E.A. inspectors in return for the removal of previously imposed

17

“Iran Proliferation Issues,” Arms Control Association, 2018, https://www.armscont
rol.org/taxonomy/term/140.
18

“Iran Proliferation Issues,” Arms Control Association.

19

"Iran Proliferation Issues,” Arms Control Association.

20

“Iran Proliferation Issues,” Arms Control Association.

21

Kelsey Davenport, “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance,”
Arms Control Association, May 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-aglance.
22

U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Executive Order 13608,” May 1, 2012, https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/fse_eo.pdf.
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sanctions.23 However, some significant flaws in the J.C.P.O.A. do not entirely address the issue
of Iranian proliferation and allow for an open-ended pathway at the end of its sunset provisions
for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. This opened-ended pathway is worrisome because up until
this time, Iran has cheated on its nuclear promises, and has made its intention to obtain nuclear
weapons apparent.
During his testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, former Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph identified five
flaws of the J.C.P.O.A. that are detrimental to the assurance of non-proliferation by the Iranian
state. These are: ineffective verification; providing a pathway to nuclear weapons; busting the
sanctions regime; failure to prevent a breakout; and, failure to limit ballistic missiles.24 Instead of
applying the usual twenty-four-hour notice that most intrusive inspection regimes call for
(especially with a country prone to cheating), the J.C.P.O.A. allows for a twenty-four-day notice,
which Iran can further delay by referring the inspection procedure to the U.N. security council.25
This agreement only includes declared sites, which is concerning because Iran has used
undeclared military bases in the past to cheat on agreements.26

23

Davenport, “(JCPOA) at a Glance.”

24

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “JCPOA: Non‐
Proliferation, Inspections, and Nuclear Constraints: Testimony Prepared by Dr. Robert Joseph,”
113th Cong., 2015, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/080415_Joseph_Testimony
.pdf.
25

U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations, “JCPOA.”

26

Shashank Bengali, Ramin Mostaghim, “Iran Says Military Sites are Off-Limits for
Nuclear Inspections Despite U.S. Pressure,” Los Angeles Times, August, 30, 2017, https://www.
latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-iran-nuclear-20170830-story.html.
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The second flaw is that the J.C.P.O.A. does not wholly stop Iran from producing fissile
material. Even though multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions called for cessation of all
enrichment actions, the nuclear deal leaves Iran with an extensive enrichment infrastructure.27
Within the confines of the deal, Iran can use this infrastructure to cheat and “sneak out,” as well
as reprocess plutonium when the deal expires.28 Before the deal occurred, the I.A.E.A. found
blueprints for nuclear weapons, and in the intervening years, Iran has rebuffed I.A.E.A. attempts
to adequately access sites and documents.29
A third flaw in the J.C.P.O.A. is the busting of the sanctions regime that was put into
place through over a decade of efforts.30 These sanctions were put in place in 2002 by the United
Nations, European Union, and other individual countries in an attempt to stop Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon.31 In total, Iran is likely to obtain $20 billion in sanctions
alleviation.32 This easing, in turn, will almost eliminate the economic leverage that the U.S. had
built up over the years. Alongside an extensive effort to acquire nuclear weapons, Iran is also
known to support terrorist organizations and regimes hostile to U.S. interests. The money

27

U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations, “JCPOA.”

28

U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations, “JCPOA.”

29

U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations, “JCPOA.”

30

Ilan Berman, Iran's Deadly Ambition: The Islamic Republic’s Quest for Global Power
(Encounter Books, 2015), 2-3.
31

“Iran Nuclear Crisis: What are the Sanctions?” BBC News, March 30, 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15983302.
32

Berman, 3.
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realized through the lifting of sanctions could ostensibly be utilized to support such efforts in the
future.33
Fourth, the ability for Iran to breakout is not permanently addressed. Before the
J.C.P.O.A. negotiations, Iran was perceived to have a breakout time between two and three
months. Under the restrictions placed on the deal, the breakout time is theoretically increased to
12 months, assuming Iran cooperates with the limitations set in place. However, once the deal’s
sunset provisions come into play, the breakout time would then be accelerated back to the two to
three month timeframe.34 If the United States were worried about this breakout time in the past, it
would not make sense that it would be accepting of the same breakout time in the future,
especially as Iran would be even more dangerous with its advancing military technology,
economy, and influence.
Finally, the J.C.P.O.A. does not limit Iran’s continuation of its Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (I.C.B.M.) program. During negotiations and since the deal was implemented, Iran has
developed, advanced, and tested ballistic missile technology through its space launch program.
The pursuit of this capability directly challenges the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929,
which stipulates that “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of
carrying nuclear weapons.”35 This is worrisome because the space launch vehicles that Iran is
attempting to acquire is easily transferrable to intercontinental ballistic missile weaponry. If Iran
is actually serious about giving up its desire for nuclear weapons, why would it break faith with a
33
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Security Council resolution for an expensive technology that is deemed worthless without a
nuclear payload?
In April 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel’s
intelligence services had uncovered over 100,000 files secretly hidden in Iran detailing “Project
Amad,” which was the secret Iranian nuclear weapons program operating without the knowledge
of international inspectors in early 2000s.36 In his presentation to the press, Netanyahu described
the files as containing, “incriminating documents, incriminating charts, incriminating
presentations, incriminating blueprints, incriminating photos, incriminating videos, and more.”37
Furthermore, the Prime Minister noted that he shared the files with the United States, which
further confirmed the legitimacy of the find.
Documents from Project Amad state that its goal was to, “design, produce, and test, five
warheads, each with a 10-kiloton yield, for integration onto a missile.”38 This is equivalent to
about five of the bombs the United States used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Netanyahu claimed
that Iran has lied about their nuclear weapons program, and that they continued to lie to the
I.A.E.A. about compliance with the requirements of the nuclear deal.39 Because of this
information, the Israeli Prime Minister asserted that the Iran deal was founded on lies. Partly due
to these documents, President Trump pulled out of the J.C.P.O.A. in May 2018, making the
nuclear future of Iran even more uncertain.
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It is important to note that up until this point, the U.S. intelligence apparatus had stated
that Iran has complied with the nuclear deal even as the United States has left it. Director of
National Intelligence Daniel Coats stated that “we continue to assess that Iran is not currently
undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a
nuclear device.”40 Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) Gina Haspel also noted
that, “at the moment [Tehran is] in compliance.”41
The path taken by Iran up to this point closely mirrors the strategy utilized by North
Korea in its journey to a nuclear capability. It is entirely possible, given Iran’s history of
cheating, that it would attempt to bide its time and break from the restrictions and requirements
set in place from the J.C.P.O.A. Also, a future pathway to nuclear weapons is open to Iran, with
associated economic benefits, if the Iranians are willing to wait patiently.

Current and Evolving Weapons Capabilities
A significant cause for concern to U.S. security interests in the Middle East is the current
and evolving weapons advances emanating from Iran. In addition to its space launch program,
Iran has also partaken in the continued purchase, development, and fielding of ballistic missiles,
anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarine weaponry. Also, Iran has made a robust effort towards
establishing an air and missile defense capability, seeking to increase its area denial aptitude in
regions of importance. The previous President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Andrew Krepinevich, noted in his report Critical Mass that Iran is likely in the
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future to seek, acquire, and master technologies such as guided weapons, warhead
miniaturization, and cyber competence to establish themselves as the premier power in the
Middle East.42
An advanced technology that is highly-alluring to Iran is guided weaponry. Guided
weapons are so attractive because of the accuracy and economy-of-force capabilities that they
give to both conventional and nuclear weapons employed by a country’s military. For example,
if Iran were to gain a nuclear capability (even one with low yield), a robust guidance system
would allow those weapons to have a more substantial effect. It has been shown that guided
weaponry significantly increases the conventional capabilities of a military, as well. In Critical
Mass, Andrew Krepinevich states that conventional precision-guided munitions could achieve
nuclear-like effects by targeting specific nuclear infrastructure, causing devastation similar to a
WMD.43
Warhead miniaturization is one of the key technical hurdles that must be mastered in
order to achieve an effective nuclear missile arsenal.44 Missiles are extremely important to a
country’s nuclear capability because they allow a 24/7 readiness capability that can be delivered
faster and more assuredly than through any other means. Countries with a weaker economy, such
as Iran or North Korea, would likely seek shortcuts to field a nuclear missile arsenal.45
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Because of Iran’s educated workforce and science community, it is likely that they would
be better equipped than other rogue countries (such as North Korea) to quickly master this
technology. Furthermore, Iran’s already well-developed military production capabilities make
warhead miniaturization and integration with existing weapons systems more feasible.
Thirdly, Iran is likely to acquire more highly-evolved cyber technology. Cyber
technology is developing faster and becoming more integrated with military operations
worldwide. After being affected by Stuxnet, Iran has worked diligently to enhance its offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities. If Iran is not able to obtain a robust cyber defense, they may
delegate a decentralized launch authority for their missiles so that they would be able to conduct
a military operation if they suspected that their systems were subject to sabotage. Andrew
Krepinevich also notes the possibility that a non-state actor could potentially target Iranian
sensor capabilities via cyber-attack, making them believe that a missile strike was imminent in
order to start an all-out war.46 Investing in cyber also gives Iran the ability to better protect its
own systems. From the Iranian point of view, it is essential that their systems are not vulnerable
to hacking, as it would allow other countries to exploit weaknesses in their systems, and possibly
rendering them useless.
As previously stated, Iran has continued to invest in ballistic missiles and space launch
technology. While it was estimated that Iran would have an I.C.B.M. capability before now, it
has not yet definitively demonstrated this aptitude.47 The majority of Iran’s current ballistic
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missile stockpile derives itself from short to medium-range Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, which
originated from Soviet-designed R-17 missiles.48
Inferring from recent tests of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, it is likely that
Iran is primarily focusing its attention on improving accuracy.49 The bulk of Iranian heavy
artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are tactical, with a range of 500 kilometers or less.50 While
Iran has demonstrated competency in developing these Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
(S.R.B.M.s), it still depends on outside sources (such as North Korea) for materials and
fundamental mechanisms.51 The S.R.B.M. capability is a primary necessity for Iranian military
strategy because it allows them to operate and hold the U.S. and its allies’ bases under threat in
the Gulf region. For example, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s (I.R.G.C.) airspace
division, Amirali Hajizadeh, has stated that Iran is capable of striking U.S. forces and aircraft
carriers in the region if they encroach on strategic locations.52 Due to the recent improvement in
Iranian missile capabilities, U.S. bases such as the “Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Al Dhafra
base in the United Arab Emirates, and the Kandahar base in Afghanistan” are susceptible to
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successful strikes by the Iranian military.53
Concurrently alongside the S.R.B.M. program, Iran has continued to develop and produce
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (M.R.B.M.s) which retain ranges up to 2,000 kilometers.54
According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (N.A.S.I.C.), the number of
launchers that Iran possesses is undetermined. However, Iran has publicly stated that it had
mass-produced Shahab-3 M.R.B.M.s.55 To ensure a second strike capability in the case of a preemptive strike by another country, Iran has begun to construct an underground network of
bunkers and launch facilities.56 These M.R.B.M.s would be capable of reaching targets as far as
Cairo on the western front, and Islamabad on the eastern.57 While sanctions and export controls
have made the acquisition of key components of M.R.B.M.s more difficult, Iran has exploited
frailties within non-proliferation regimes or worked alongside nations willing to evade those
laws in order to acquire a medium range capability.58
While an explicit I.C.B.M. capability has not been operationally demonstrated, Iran has
still sought to enhance its ambitious space launch program, either for national pride or national
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use. The issue for U.S. defense concerning the Iranian space launch program is the inherent
connection between this technology and I.C.B.M.s. The U.S. Intelligence community has noted
that it is likely that Iran desires an I.C.B.M. capability in order to provide a strategic
counter/deterrent to the United States.59 Since 2008, Iran has successfully launched multiple
Space Launch Vehicles (S.L.V.s) and continues to develop other S.L.V.s capable of carrying
heavier payloads.60 Admiral Bill Gortney from the U.S. Northern Command stated, “Iran may be
able to deploy an operational I.C.B.M. by 2020 if the regime chooses to do so.”61
In order to maintain control over its regional borders and economic chokepoints, Iran has
pursued area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to inhibit the U.S. and others from navigating freely
and exercising their strategic objectives within the Gulf region and surrounding areas. These
unique capabilities pose a serious threat to the United States in economic strongholds such as the
Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, Persian Gulf, and especially the Strait of Hormuz.62 Due to the
narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz (through which 20% of the world’s petroleum shipping
passes), Iran would have a reasonable chance of threatening commerce and denying access to the
resources of the Persian Gulf by utilizing “fast attack craft (FAC’s), suicide boats, anti-ship
cruise missiles, and mines.”63
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Iran is reported to be aggressively pursuing these capabilities, most notably anti-ship
cruise missiles and air defense systems. Due to an expiring U.N. arms embargo in 2020, Iran is
likely to purchase submarine launched anti-ship cruise missiles and torpedoes to improve its
naval and A2/AD capabilities.64 Commenting on the pending end of the embargo, Iranian Deputy
Defense Minister for international Affairs Second Brigadier General Mohammad Ahadi stated,
"Increasing the capabilities of various types of ballistic and cruise missiles, the acquisition of a
new generation of fighter jets as well as... vessels and submarines with various weapons
capabilities are among the new plans of the ministry.”65 The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
noted that these developments are a clear indicator that Iran is continuing to place more
importance on the ability to control the maritime environment in its security posture.66
In addition to its anti-ship weapons, Iran has continued to expand its air and missile
defense. A missile defense system would not only help Iran maintain dominance over
chokepoints and other areas of importance, but would be extremely useful if Iran wished to
launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike and would need to defend itself against any retaliatory
capabilities.67 The most recent and notable development in the Iranian missile defense arsenal is
the homegrown Bavar-373 air defense system, which apparently and successfully intercepted an
incoming missile during recent testing.

An Iranian Brigadier General described the Bavar-373
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as “more powerful and more reliable” than the current S-300 Russian system, which was fielded
in 2016.68 The Bavar-373 is more attractive to the Iranians, because of its above-stated
reliability, and its domestic manufacturing. Iranian officials have stated that these defensive
capabilities will never be included in any future arms-control negotiations.69

Use of Terrorist Proxies
Although first characterized as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, Iran began to utilize
terrorist organizations after its Islamic Revolution of 1979 as an extension of its ideology, and to
execute dissidents around the globe.70 To complete these objectives, Iran utilizes its Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, which is responsible for military operations (both
public and covert) outside of Iran’s borders.71 In these foreign operations, the Quds Force seeks
to provide funding, weapons, and protections for terrorist groups it is backing. To this day, the
U.S. State Department still characterizes Iran as the world’s foremost state sponsor of
terrorism.72
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Iran has for many years supported terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, who before 9/11
had killed more Americans than any other terrorist organization.73 Currently, Iran provides close
to one billion dollars per year split between Hezbollah (~$700,000,000), other Palestinian groups
(~$1,000,000), and other terrorist organizations.74 The primary target of Iranian backed terrorism
is Israel, which is the target for the bulk of attacks sponsored by Iran. Utilizing these proxy
terrorist forces allows Iran to continue to oppose the Jewish State, give them prestige within the
Muslim world, and undermine any peace process that could be reached with Israel.75
These forces pose an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces and their operations, as well as to
U.S. diplomats and civilians abroad. Iran can use terrorist organizations to extend their own
power, and to have a more genuinely global reach and influence. They can serve as a deterrent
against U.S. military incursions, forcing the nation to carefully consider any actions that they
might take against the Islamic Republic, because of the threat of terrorist retaliatory acts. Finally,
concerns about terrorism that utilizes WMDs arise from Iran’s close connections with these
organizations. Because Iran has patronized and cooperated with terrorist groups and provided
them with weapons, funds and training, it is not unreasonable to assume that Iran would be likely
to utilize existing terrorist networks to implement covert WMD attacks.

Conflict and Risk of Proliferation in the Middle East
Despite previously mentioned constraints put in place via the J.C.P.O.A., Iran still retains
73

Byman, “Proxy Power.”

74

Ambassador Nathan Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism at State Department,
Panel for the Washington Institute’s Center for Near East Policy, https://www.washington
institute.org/policy-analysis/view/tehrans-international-targets-assessing-iranian-terrorsponsorship.
75

Byman, “Proxy Power.”
24

the ability and capacity to develop a nuclear bomb within one year of deciding to do so. 76 If Iran
were to acquire a nuclear weapon, it is likely that other countries in the region would also seek a
nuclear capability to offset the bipolar struggle between Iran and Israel (whom most defense
analysts believe already have nuclear weapons). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt as the states
most likely to pursue nuclear weapons capability should Iran acquire them.77
The Saudi prince, intelligence chief, and the ambassador to the United States, Turki alFaisal, has already stated that Saudi Arabia might follow suit in response to an Iranian nuclear
arsenal.78 Saudi Arabia and Iran have a deep historical rivalry, exacerbated by religious tensions.
Iran and Saudi Arabia see themselves as the world’s leading Shi’a and Sunni powers
respectively. Being the historical birthplace of Islam and holding the two most significant
religious sites (Mecca and Medina), Saudi Arabia has always seen itself as the leader of the
Muslim world. However, this idea was challenged in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution of Iran,
which wanted to establish itself as the leader of the Muslim world and export its particular type
of theocracy beyond its borders.79
While not fighting each other directly, these tensions have been playing themselves out in
proxy regional conflicts (e.g. in Yemen) in a way that is similar to the Cold War fought between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The removal of Saddam Hussein resulting from the U.S.76
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led invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a serious power vacuum in the region and has caused various
Middle Eastern powers and terrorist groups (such as the Islamic State) to compete for influence.
Since then, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in the Arab world further caused instability, giving
Iran and Saudi Arabia further opportunity to promote their influence and brand of Islam,
especially within Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Lebanon.80
The strategic rivalry seems to be getting worse because Iran appears to be gaining
strength. In Syria, after more than seven years of civil war, President Bashar al-Assad (who is
sympathetic to, and receives significant support from the Iranian regime) seems to have
solidified his continued rule.81 Even though there is still Kurdish opposition to the Syrian ruling
regime in the Northeast, as well as in another rebel stronghold, it appears likely that Assad will
remain in power, thus giving Iran a strategic boost.
Saudi Arabia has also continued to involve itself in a violent and costly civil war waging
in Yemen between the Saudi/U.S/United Kingdon/French-backed government of Abdrabbuh
Mansour Hadi, and the Houthi Shi’a Muslim rebel movement in the northern Saada province.82
The coalition fighting against the Houthi rebels fear a permanent Iranian presence in a Shi’amajority state. There have been accusations from Saudi Arabian and U.S. officials that Iran is
providing funding, weapons, and logistical support to the Houthi rebels – claims that Iran
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denies.83 To address this regional struggle, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former Defense
Secretary James Mattis proposed a ceasefire and negotiations to halt the three years of conflict in
Yemen.84
The Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Namik Tan, also stated that Turkey would not
tolerate Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and would not close the issue of whether their country
would acquire nuclear weapons as well.85 Andrew Krepinevich claims that an Iranian nuclear
weapon would likely cause other significant players in the region to seek capabilities of their
own. Saudi Arabia would possibly acquire a “Sunni Arab Bomb” in response to Iran’s “Shi’a
bomb.”86 Saudi Arabia could potentially outsource its nuclear capability as well, relying on
another primarily-Sunni nation such as Pakistan to deploy nuclear weapons on its soil.87 It is also
likely that other global superpowers would seek to back critical players in the region to support
their objectives.88 If this were to be so, the Middle East could devolve into an even more
dangerous proxy front, similar to the Cold War.
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Review
The Iranian threat is significant, because of the destabilizing activities in which it
currently takes part, as well as the implications and potential of a breakout into a nuclear state. In
the case of an Iranian breakout, it is extremely likely that the Middle East would devolve into
further chaos, which would threaten U.S. and allied interests in the region, and ultimately even
more broadly. To address this threat, it is imperative that the United States tailor its WMD
deterrence and non-proliferation strategy to be directed specifically for Iran.
The deterrence strategy used during the Cold War may not be sufficient to tackle this
challenge, mostly because it assumed that actors around the world make rational decisions in the
same way that the American policymakers do. On the contrary, Iranian leaders have a completely
different cultural background in contrast with the leadership of the United States. Because of
this, U.S. deterrence strategy may need to be reevaluated to consider Iranian values and
rationality. By understanding the evolution and fallacies associated with previous U.S. deterrence
strategies, the task of generating an approach by U.S. leadership may lead to a greater
understanding of the complexities and uncertainties of nuclear deterrence.
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THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES DETERRENCE POLICY
“Deterrence itself is not a pre-eminent value; the primary values are safety and morality.”89
Herman Khan – In Defense of Thinking, 2009

In order to understand why a tailored deterrence strategy is necessary to contain and
defeat the Islamic Republic of Iran if conflict were to break out, one must understand the
foundation and evolution of American deterrence policy up to this point. While deterrence did
not fail during the Cold War, a new threat environment has emerged where a single formula or
theory is not enough to contend against these threats. By understanding the fallacies associated
with traditional Cold War deterrence, devising a modern approach that improves upon the
shortfalls of previous deterrence theory will be simpler to attain.
The idea of deterrence at its core is a military strategy in which one side attempts to
manipulate an opponent’s strategic calculus with the possible threat of reprisal to a hostile action.
By doing so, an opponent will be less likely to assume that any initial action will meet their
objectives, and will therefore be deterred from pursuing those goals. Deterrence has been present
throughout the history of humanity, but took on a completely different role in global affairs with
the advent of nuclear weapons.
On August 6th and August 9th, 1945, the world forever changed when U.S. President
Harry Truman ordered the dropping of two atomic bombs, “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” on the
Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively.90 The bombs caused massive devastation
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and convinced the Japanese to surrender, ending the Second World War. By observing the
devastation that these weapons would cause in a wartime scenario, intellectuals and leaders
began to examine how atomic bombs would alter the perceptions of warfare and victory in the
nuclear age.
One of the first atomic age defense intellectuals to extensively write on the changes to
American military strategy was Bernard Brodie. In his magnum opus, The Absolute Weapon,
Brodie spoke about the altering effects that nuclear weapons would have upon U.S. security
policy, stating: “Thus the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age
of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of
retaliation in kind. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars.
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”91 In making that statement, Brodie was
not for the moment concerned about who would win the next war in which atomic bombs would
be used, but rather how any such war might be avoided.
The conception of this idea led to the exploration by academics, strategists, scientists, and
those in many other civilian and military occupations to begin to formulate theories of how to
prevent a nuclear war; or if prevention were to fail, how to win it. These thoughts and plans were
designed with a Soviet Union adversary in mind, as in August 1949 that country completed its
first nuclear test, ushering in the inevitability of a nuclear weapon stockpile buildup.92 While
many persons wrote about and had an influence on the subject, two leading intellectuals stood
out above the rest, Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling.
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Kahn’s Credible Deterrent
Herman Kahn first started theorizing about nuclear deterrence strategy at the RAND
Corporation, where he helped further provide analysis and criticism regarding the nuclear
strategy of the Eisenhower Administration known as the New Look.93 The New Look was an
effort to minimize the conventional military gap between the Soviets and western powers in
Europe by utilizing as leverage the higher numbers of nuclear weapons the U.S. had in its
stockpile at the time. This doctrine was also known as “massive retaliation,” which attempted to
solve the problem of communist expansion by making it clear that Soviet aggression anywhere
would be met with a nuclear attack, “at a time and place of America’s choosing.”94 If provoked,
the United States affirmed that they would enact a nuclear first strike.
However, analysts at RAND such as Herman Kahn noted certain fallacies and shortfalls
within the New Look. For instance, the Eisenhower administration never specified the amount of
aggression that would qualify to trigger U.S. massive retaliation. The Eisenhower administration
bet on the fact that this ambiguity would serve as enough of a disincentive that the Soviets would
default to being cautious. However, critics believed that this policy left an “invitation” for the
Soviets to preemptively utilize a first-strike on U.S. bomber bases, leaving the Americans
without a nuclear capability and force them into a ground war against a much superior
conventional force.95
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To address the problems with massive retaliation, Herman Kahn toured the country
delivering lectures through Princeton University’s Center for International Studies. This series of
lectures was eventually published in a comprehensive volume (with other added material) known
as On Thermonuclear War.96 Within this extensive text, Herman Kahn mapped out what he
believed was necessary to establish a credible deterrent.
By recognizing that a breakout of nuclear war was entirely possible, Herman Kahn stated
coldly and objectively that if nuclear war were to occur, tens to hundreds of millions of humans
could perish. Going further, he stated that, “a thermonuclear war is quite likely to be an
unprecedented catastrophe for the defender… But an ‘unprecedented’ catastrophe can be a far
cry from an ‘unlimited’ one.”97 Even though the loss of such life would seem unthinkable to the
leadership of the United States, Kahn argued that unless the United States was able to
demonstrate its willingness to wage war and lose massive numbers of its citizens and amounts of
infrastructure (no matter how undesirable), and that it could still accept those losses and survive,
its deterrence strategy would have no meaning.98
In response to the Eisenhower administration’s policy of “massive retaliation,” Kahn put
forth the idea that only having an offensive and first-strike capability based on nuclear weapons
alone was not conceivable, moral, or credible.99 Herman Kahn’s solution to the issues related to
deterrence, while thoroughly presented and complex in his book, can be simplified into the idea
of maintaining a credible “second-strike” capability. He wrote, “At the minimum, an adequate
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deterrent for the United States must provide an objective basis for a Soviet calculation that would
persuade them that, no matter how skillful or ingenious they were, an attack on the United States
would lead to a very high risk, if not certainty, of large-scale destruction to Soviet civil society
and military forces.”100 For utility purposes, this minimum and appropriate goal of deterrence
condensed itself into three points: Deterring a direct attack on the Homeland; Extended
Deterrence; and, Lex Talionis.101
Deterring a direct attack on the homeland was the first of Kahn’s goals to establish
deterrence. To do so, the United States would need to establish a system to make nuclear
weapons survivable. In completing this objective, the U.S. would seek a broad and almost
limitless range of capabilities to deter attacks. For instance, the U.S. might have a number of
threats to Soviet leadership, military forces, civilian population, and infrastructure, such as
buried and reinforced missile silos and other “counterforce” capabilities.102 Kahn argued, that if
nuclear weapons were not survivable, then it would make the U.S. rely on quick reaction to deter
a direct attack, making the U.S. seem “trigger happy.”103 This could in part make opponents
compelled to strike first, because Kahn notes in a nuclear war that a first strike carries a huge
advantage for the one enacting it.104
Secondly, and going hand-in-hand with deterring a direct attack, was the idea of extended
deterrence. In Kahn’s view, the threat of Soviet invasion of U.S. allies (especially those in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) challenged U.S. credibility in its deterrence policy.
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Opposing the original Eisenhower doctrine of a sizeable but straightforward nuclear offensive
threat, Kahn alleged that, “extended nuclear deterrence based on a threat that would be suicidal if
executed could be viewed as an incredible bluff, and could consequently invite challenges.”105 In
order to re-establish this credibility, the United States would need to ensure an extended
deterrence for its allies against the Soviets.
Kahn estimated that to achieve extended deterrence, the United States would need to
create and maintain reliable missile, air, counterforce, and civil defense systems. As noted
earlier, Kahn believed that in order to establish a credible deterrent, the United States would need
to solidify in the enemy’s mind that the country was completely ready to engage in a nuclear
war, and escalate if need be, all the while protecting its citizenry.106 If the enemy believed that
the United States was committed to defending itself first and foremost, then it would lend more
integrity to its vow that it would also then provide its allies protection under its nuclear umbrella.
Furthermore, building up these defenses would diminish an enemy’s first strike capability, thus
giving itself the necessary resources to provide a credible deterrent, and also save as many lives
as possible if a nuclear exchange were to occur.107
Finally, Kahn believed that the idea of “Lex Talionis” was essential in his strategy.108 Lex
Talionis (or, an eye for an eye) refers to the principle of Talion Law, which was prevalent in
Babylonian, Biblical, and Roman law, in which one would “receive as punishment precisely
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those injuries and damages they had inflicted upon their victims.”109 This policy translated into
deterrence strategy describes the ability to engage in small levels of retaliation in response to
small level attacks. The idea is that if the United States could reply to any Soviet attack in kind,
then it would be able to alter the Soviet decision-making process, e.g. that an attack against the
United States would be worthless because the same amount of damage would be dealt back
simultaneously. Also, when added to the other two of Khan’s goals of deterrence (Protecting the
Homeland and Extended Deterrence) and the mechanisms of which they entail, Kahn thought
that the Soviets would have no other choice than to assume that the United States would be able
to control and “deliberately initiate nuclear escalation, if necessary, to protect vital interests.”110
These assurances would give the United States credibility in the Soviet view, which Khan saw as
“a threat that leaves little to chance.”111

Schelling’s Threat that Leaves Something to Chance
During this period when intellectuals were debating the philosophy, uses, and the future
of nuclear weapons, one other theorist stood out as a leader on the debate alongside Kahn.
However, this person played an antithetical role. Thomas Schelling was an economist who had
also spent time at the RAND Corporation, and his work concerned nuclear deterrence as well.
Most of his writings came to be compiled into the 1960 study, The Strategy of Conflict.
In this work, Schelling came to an almost entirely different and distinct solution to what
Kahn had suggested previously as the solution to establishing a credible deterrent against the
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Soviet threat. In what eventually became known as the doctrine of “Mutual Assured Destruction”
(M.A.D.), Schelling argued, in sharp contrast to Kahn, that, “Deterrence is based on the threat
that leaves something to chance.”112 M.A.D. can be condensed to the idea that the destructive
power of nuclear weapons is so mighty, that an attack by either adversary would invite a
response that would be unacceptably lethal and destructive. However, if both sides were to
commit to keeping their defenses open and leaving a retaliatory or second-strike capability intact
by ensuring the survival of their nuclear weapons, then neither side would participate in an action
that could potentially escalate to nuclear war because it would result in the mutually-assured
destruction of both parties.
Three main themes arise from Schelling’s theory of deterrence that leaves something to
chance: The targeting of urban-industrial targets is sufficient enough to achieve deterrence;
defenses of any sort are inherently destabilizing; and, that one does not need a logical deterrent
threat to deter war.113 In contrast with Kahn, Schelling believed that a nation did not need a
broad range of capabilities to hold hostage a variety of enemy targets, but that merely targeting
the urban industrial complex of an enemy (populations and industrial assets) was sufficient to
achieve the desired outcome.114 Schelling argued that by doing so, a nation would put under
threat the critical elements of what an adversary’s leadership holds valuable. If a nation were to
end a nuclear exchange with their cities and population destroyed, then it would not be viewed as
beneficial to have a conflict escalate to that point in the first place.115
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The second theme prevalent throughout Schelling’s theory of a threat that leaves
something to chance is the belief that defenses are inherently destabilizing. Because the idea of
M.A.D. is that neither side would wish to take part in an action that could escalate into a nuclear
exchange (which would quite likely result in the assured destruction of both sides), defenses
which could eliminate or undermine that balance would then incentivize either side to strike first
to gain the advantage.
In what he coins as “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack,” Schelling stated, “If surprise
carries an advantage, it is worthwhile to avert it by striking first. Fear that the other may be about
to strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike gives us a motive for striking, and so
justifies the other’s motive. But if the gains from even a successful surprise are less desired than
no war at all, there is no ‘fundamental’ basis for an attack by either side.”116
What Schelling conveyed in this message is that if one side could withstand a retaliatory
response from an opponent after an initial first strike, it might lead the opponent with a lesser
defensive advantage to strike first (in fears that if they do not, they will be outmatched in an
exchange). However, if neither side contained a defensive capability, the only result of nuclear
war would be the destruction of both sides.117 As a result, Schelling’s theory calls upon the
elimination of civil, air, and missile defense, so that an enemy will believe that the balance of
M.A.D. is credible.
Finally, the third principal component of Schelling’s deterrence strategy is the
acknowledgment that a nation does not need a logical deterrent threat to deter war. In distinction
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to Kahn’s threat that leaves little to chance, Schelling noted that deterrence works through a fog
of war, in which the uncertainty of escalation leads both sides to be averse to actions and
accidents that could potentially escalate into nuclear war.118 In addition, an actor such as the
United States could purposely escalate a conflict, to “intimidate an adversary and expose him to
a shared risk, or deterring him by showing that if he makes a contrary move he may disturb us so
that we slip over the brink whether we want to or not, carrying him with us.”119
This nuclear game of chicken became known as “brinksmanship,” in which Schelling
described the applicability of the United States “rocking the boat” by deliberately letting a
situation get somewhat out of hand, to coerce an adversary to back down out of fear of further
escalation.120 Instead of Kahn’s approach to establishing a credible deterrent by being able to
control escalation at any time that one wishes (with a broad range of capabilities), Schelling
instead believed that deterrence would be kept intact by the vague notion of uncontrolled
escalation, thus not needing a logical deterrent.

Cold War Nuclear Policy
While Schelling and Kahn were the primary spokesmen in the debate on nuclear strategy
during the Cold War, and both subsequentially influenced U.S. nuclear planning, it is apparent
that Schelling’s theories were the ones that primarily guided U.S. leadership in the development
of nuclear policy vis-à-vis the Soviets and other adversaries. Even though there were some early
missile defense endeavors (e.g. Project Nike, which employed nuclear tipped proximity missiles
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to overcome the hit-to-kill accuracy problem), which were in opposition to Schelling’s
hypothesis that such efforts were destabilizing, none of them were adopted to a great magnitude,
or even close to a magnitude of what Kahn would have recommended.121 Furthermore, it was
also a prudent decision by U.S. policy makers because such systems were expensive, and the
technology was not well-developed. It is also apparent that Kahn’s theories were not mainstream
in U.S. decision making, due to the lack of large-scale civil and air defense preparations in the
U.S. homeland.122 While the U.S. maintained counterforce capabilities within its nuclear arsenal
(e.g. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle warheads) that corresponded to Kahn’s
thinking, the emphasis in U.S. policy more closely followed Schelling’s theories by ensuring an
effective nuclear triad that had a strong second-strike capability.
Schelling’s deterrence strategy offered a technical engineering solution to the nuclear
problem, by creating a numerical solution for the number of weapons needed for a second-strike
capability in order to hold an enemy hostage. Robert McNamara, Defense Secretary for
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, famously created the metrics for what he
deemed to be the “unacceptable damage” needed to sustain a deterrence against an adversary,
which was defined as “20-25 percent population and 50 percent industry.”123 If the United States
could create a survivable nuclear force (via the nuclear triad of bombers, missiles and
submarines) which retained the capability of inflicting this amount of damage on an adversary
as a second-strike capability, then it would lead to credible deterrence and thus stability. This
policy was also more straightforward to sustain, as a precise number and capability of weapons
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would be cheaper to maintain than following Kahn’s policy of essentially unlimited buildup of
nuclear forces, which would be too costly to create, maintain and control.
Furthermore, due to the view that the buildup of defensive forces and the fielding of
offensive forces which threatened targets other than cities/industry was destabilizing, M.A.D. left
open the possibility of arms control and diplomacy between adversaries.124 Schelling notes in his
Nobel autobiography that the role of arms control in U.S. nuclear policy “should be oriented
toward measures that precluded either side’s acquiring a pre-emptive capability, a ‘first-strike’
capability as it was called. And this objective, somewhat paradoxically, entailed arranging for the
safety not of populations and industrial assets but of retaliatory nuclear weapons.”125

Downsides and Fallacies of Kahn and Schelling’s Theories
In the end, Schelling’s theories were justified with U.S. religious principles as to whether
the use or possession of nuclear weapons were ethical, and helped define the mainstream
thinking regarding deterrence for decades to come.126 However, as one looks to apply deterrence
theory to the modern threat environment, it becomes apparent that the theories made prominent
during the Cold War are fallible, not entirely relevant, or even unachievable.
Herman Kahn’s credible deterrent was unlikely to succeed. Firstly, in order to achieve
the all-around capabilities needed to hold the full range of enemy targets hostage and create a
defensive infrastructure sufficient to make an opponent recognize U.S. credibility in the event of
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an escalation, the United States would have needed to spend more money and resources than was
feasible at the time. It was determined that “at each level of damage the defense had to spend
three times as much as the offense.”127 Much of the required technology was not available at the
time, e.g. missile defense. While substantial improvements have been made that could be
successfully applied to other threats and situations, the United States does still not have the
capacity to track, target, and intercept a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. While some could argue
that it depends on how much priority a nation puts on achieving these systems determines their
actual achievability, policymakers and legislators would not likely be willing to spend massive
amounts of funding (possibly harming the U.S. economy), investing in systems that are not
proven or achievable at the time.
Furthermore, in contrast to Schelling, Kahn’s buildup of capabilities did not leave much
room for arms control to reduce threats and costs. Kahn’s theories called for a massive military
buildup to ensure credibility, which arms control efforts would limit. Instead, Schelling’s theory
identified a critical number of survivable assets, thus ensuring a second-strike capability, that
would therefore convince enemy leadership that an attack would not be worthwhile. For
policymakers at the time, Kahn’s ideas put limits on the potential promise and effectiveness of
diplomacy and was not a path worth taking.128
Schelling’s theories ultimately contained downsides and fallacies which negated their
effectiveness in applying deterrence to a range of competitors in what became the post-Cold War
environment. Unlike Kahn, Schelling’s theories contained no “Plan B” in case deterrence failed.
Because of his view that defenses were destabilizing, and populations needed to be left
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unguarded to establish deterrence, the entire population of the United States would be vulnerable
if there were to be a nuclear exchange. Fear of this threat is not unreasonable, as accidents have
occurred throughout history via miscalculations, and in the fog of war.
Secondly, Schelling’s theory of the United States being able to “rock the boat” in order to
escalate a conflict so that the Soviets would eventually de-escalate did not take into account that
an opponent may be able to “rock the boat,” as well.129 The level at which a nation would stop
“rocking the boat” is entirely unclear. If both sides believed that they would be able to get the
other side to “chicken out” then it is possible that a conflict could unintentionally escalate to a
nuclear exchange.130 Because the idea is that uncertainty would cause both actors to act
cautiously in the fog of war, it overlooks the fact that this is no certainty at all… which would be
a massive and unacceptable gamble for political, military or strategic planners alike.
Most importantly, for both Kahn and Schelling’s deterrence strategies to work, an enemy
had to be a rational actor. Keith Payne defines this traditional definition of rationality as, “a
mode of decision-making that logically links desired goals with decisions about how to realize
those goals.”131 Rational actors will choose a course of action, because they have weighed the
cost-benefit analysis based upon “available information,” and that a particular “course is
calculated to be most suitable for achieving the preferred goal.”132 However, United States
policymakers assumed that the rationality of other nations would mirror their own rationality,
leading those nations to make predictable decisions. For example, it was accepted that the
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Soviets would have a similar rationality as the United States, as seen through McNamara’s
metric that one could achieve a deterrent by holding 20 to 25 percent of a population, and 50
percent of a country’s industry at risk.
However, the question remains whether there are opponents in the world who do not have
the same value hierarchy as the United States, and what would they deem to be unacceptable
damage? If someone such as Saddam Hussein, a man who sacrificed and murdered untold
millions of his own people to achieve his goals, had a nuclear arsenal, would the United States
truly be able to hold his population at risk as a credible deterrent? Rationality in the sense of
Schelling and Kahn, which influenced nuclear policy during the Cold War, did not take into
consideration the value hierarchy, decision making, honor, religion, and critical cultural drivers
of behavior that determine how an unknown variety of adversaries would make their decisions.
Included in internationally-recognized political analyst John Stoessinger’s monumental work,
Why Nations Go to War, are a myriad of case studies (e.g. Hitler’s attack on Russia, Saddam
Hussein’s wars with Iran and Kuwait, the “Sixty Years’ War” between the Israelis and Arabs, the
India and Pakistan’s conflicts, etc.) in which a lack of understanding of an opponent’s thought
processes led to miscalculations which resulted in conflict.133 This recognition that wars and
conflicts often occur because of a fundamental lack of insight into an opponent’s decisionmaking processes is a strong motivation for U.S. deterrence policy to be re-examined, so that the
nation will not make similar mistakes in the future.
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Change to a New Deterrence Model
Robert Jervis identifies four waves of thinking in deterrence theory.134 The first, as seen
primarily through those such as Bernard Brodie, acknowledges the need for a deterrence strategy
in the newly formed atomic age. The second wave, headed by theorists such as Schelling and
Kahn continued to develop these theories, often utilizing game theory and a “rational actor”
model to provide a strategic concept for policymakers. Because of the gaps within these
traditional deterrence frameworks, a third wave of deterrence emerged, one which sought to
determine how traditional deterrence theory would play out when empirically tested against case
studies, and how conventional deterrence failed against “irrational” actors.135
After the Cold War, alongside the new and changing threat environment, the fourth wave
of deterrence began to take shape, one that is continuing to this day. This fourth wave gradually
began to view the applicability of deterrence to face not only large strategic competitors, but also
non-traditional threats such as rogue states, terrorist networks, and asymmetric warfare.136
Instead of having narrow or shortsighted approaches to deterring competitors, it is more
applicable to tailor specific and appropriate strategies to different adversaries. This strategy
includes emphasizing the fact that these other opponents do not view nuclear weapons in the
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same sense that the United States does, and that they have different value systems which
influence the strategic choices that they make.137

Review
Soon after the first atomic bombs were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United
States, intellectuals began to ponder how to avoid and deter nuclear war during the arms race
which was bound to ensue. The first attempt by the Eisenhower administration emphasized
massive retaliation and an offensive first strike capability to dissuade enemy forces from
initiating conflict on any level. Herman Kahn noted the problems associated with this early
deterrence theory, becoming a leading scholar on the subject. Kahn’s theory of deterrence
underscored three necessities; deterring an attack the homeland by making nuclear weapons
survivable, obtaining a reliably extended deterrence to allies by bolstering homeland defenses,
and creating flexible offensive forces which would be able to strike back in kind to any weapons
an opponent might have.
Concurrently with Kahn, Thomas Schelling arose as the other leading academic on
deterrence theory. However, Schelling’s positions were often in direct opposition with Kahn’s,
staging the debate for theoretical supremacy regarding deterrence in the Cold War era.
Schelling’s theory called upon the realization that a capability to inflict a second-strike upon
urban-industrial targets was sufficient enough to dissuade an opponent from offensive action,
that homeland defenses are inherently destabilizing, and that one does not need a logical
deterrent to prevent a nuclear war.
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In the end, Schelling’s theories were more sought after by U.S. leadership than Kahn’s, as
they were quantifiable, affordable and achievable, and they left the door open for diplomacy and
arms control. However, the theories of both Schelling and Kahn relied upon the notion that an
opponent would be a rational actor, applying the same cost-benefit analysis and human values
that the United States would. It became apparent in the post-Cold War environment that new and
emerging threats and opponents were not necessarily going to think about rationality in the same
manner as the United States, thus ushering in third wave deterrence theory.
It is essential to be aware of this history of U.S. deterrence policy in order to establish
that today’s threat environment, and the range of appropriate responses, are quite different from
what they were when these earlier strategies and policies were prevalent. If one were to try and
implement these previous models to the present geo-political situation and current U.S. military
strategy, then the United States would be at a disadvantage, since many emerging threats and
actors think in terms different than what the U.S. would have previously thought possible or
rational. While scientific/military technology and deterrence policy has changed and improved
exponentially since the Cold War, it is still critically important for U.S. leadership to consider
and understand the motivations and justifications driving the policy decisions of opponents, so
that it can best avoid or be fully-prepared for potential conflicts.
In order to establish a system in which the United States can tailor nuclear policy based
upon the variety of ways that a current adversary can react, or the actions that such an adversary
might consider rational, it is imperative that a framework be established to act as a supplemental
tool to assist the appropriate creation of these policies and strategies. To the benefit of the United
States, such a tool was developing alongside the previous deterrence strategies used by our
nation. This paper will attempt to examine and reaffirm this tool, and related areas of study as a
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necessity for the United States to tailor nuclear policies towards an array of adversaries. This tool
is known as strategic culture.
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STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TOOL FOR WMD POLICY
“People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and
institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities,
nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their
interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are
not and often only when we know whom we are against.”138
Sam Huntington – The Clash of Civilizations

From the end of the bipolar era of the Cold War there emerged a new threshold for
policymakers to begin debating the utility of tailored deterrence strategies and implementing
them. Third-wave deterrence strategy acknowledged that one would need to gain access to the
thoughts, motivations, and value hierarchy of any adversary, so that one could attempt to predict
the sort of behavior or action that this opponent would be likely to take. The emergence of
constructivism contributed to this change, by realizing that cultural variables play a role in the
formulation of a state’s identity and decision-making structure.139 Out of this need for a new
policy framework, the concept of “strategic culture” emerged to respond to this challenge.
At its core, strategic culture emphasizes how leaders of other nations make grand
strategic decisions based in large part upon cultural influences. This is important to consider,
because the use of Cold War deterrence strategy in a post-Cold War environment can cause
policymakers to have difficulty in understanding the intentions, reasoning, and likely actions of
new and fundamentally different adversaries, often due to mirror imaging based on previous
experience.
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What is Strategic Culture?
The Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard
University, Stephen Peter Rosen, defines strategic culture as the “beliefs and assumptions that
frame… decisions to go to war, preferences for the offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of
warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable.”140 However, strategic
culture in simple terms is the values, norms, and perceptions embedded into a state’s cultural
identity that play a role in shaping the grand strategic decisions which that state makes. While
western rationality is primarily rooted in empirical testing (making decisions on a cost-benefit
calculus through trial and error), other cultures have an entirely different perception of the
pathways to deciding what a universal truth is; which could be based upon past experiences,
spirituality, or other sacred values.141 This statement does not mean that states which make
decisions based upon these other modes of thought are not “rational,” but instead within their
spheres of thought, they have created a different system of rationality with which they calculate
the costs and benefits related to strategic objectives.
It is important to note the many sources from which a strategic culture emerges (both
physical and intangible), such as geography, history, national symbols, and numerous others. 142
When considering a state’s geography, influences such as proximity to great powers, contested
boundaries, natural resources, and allies or enemies in the vicinity one’s territory influence a
nation’s culture. As an example, Iran has throughout its history been invaded continuously or
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influenced by outside powers, fought to control its boundaries and resources (as seen in the
eight-year war with Iraq), and is in close proximity to self-proclaimed enemies of its ideology
(Sunni Arabs, Israel). This constant fear and paranoia resulting from its geographical
circumstances can help explain why Iran would wish to obtain the largest and most potent
ballistic missile system in the entire Middle East.143
Secondly, history and experience have an immense role in the creation of a state’s
strategic culture. A prominent author on strategic culture, Jeffrey Lantis asserts that because
international relations theory has categorized states into multiple classes such as, “weak to
strong, colonial to postcolonial, and premodern, modern, and postmodern,” the idea is raised that
states in these different categories face different strategic challenges.144 The evolution of states
from these different categories can influence how their strategic preferences and cultures change,
as well.
States with a long and extensive history often have a complex strategic culture that has
evolved through the years. Iran is such a state, which has experienced most of the changes listed
above. Powerful national experiences, such as the development and persecution of the Shi’a
religion, outside intervention, revolution, and massive numbers of casualties in war have
modified the way that Iranians view the world, what they believe that they need to do to keep
their national narrative alive, and their country safe and prosperous.
Strategic culture can also arise from the variant myths and symbols consistent with a
society’s cultural narrative. John Calvert notes that the idea of myths within the study of strategic
culture can refer to, “a body of beliefs that express the fundamental, largely unconscious or
143
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assumed political values of a society – in short, as a dramatic expression of ideology.”145 These
myths and symbols can take many forms, such as critical texts, influential figures, national
narratives, and spiritual traditions and values. Iran has exhibited behavioral traits that stem from
national myths present within their society. One example would be a legacy of antiwesternization left behind from the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was the face
of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and served as the Iranian Supreme Leader until his death.
Alongside with understanding the sources from which strategic culture emanates, it is
important to note how a strategic culture gets passed from generation to generation, and who
controls it. In most cases, leadership and elites within the political system get to interpret their
nation’s history and develop a foreign policy which reflects their culture. Jeffrey Lantis asserts
that it is, “clear that elites are often the purveyors of the common historical narrative.”146 Some
of the political institutions from where these elites control their cultural narrative to enact
strategic foreign policy are military organizations, political parties, and domestic coalitions.147
Some cultural narratives are more prone to be held tighter by the ruling elites, depending
on the type of society. For example, Iranian society has a considerable difference, in terms of
holding and exercising power, between its elites and regular population, reminiscent of the caste
systems present throughout Iran’s long history. Because there is a significant gap in power
between Iranian elites and those in the lower classes, rising to a position of power or gaining an
influential role usually necessitates nepotism and/or birthright status. Consequently, it would be
harder for new leaders to emerge with a different outlook on foreign policy and Iran’s cultural

145

John Calvert, “The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam,” Orbis 48 (2004), 29-41.

146

Lantis, “Clausewitz to Constructivism,” 42.

147

Lantis, 42.
51

narrative, because acceptance into the elite society would necessitate adherence to the social and
political principles previously set by past leadership.
Lantis further states that strategic culture is likely to change for three reasons: External
shocks, foreign policy behavior, and elite confirmation.148 An external shock would be an
occurrence from outside of the society or nation that challenges existing norms, and which
requires an immediate response. Foreign policy behavior indicates that strategic culture may
change if a foreign policy objective comes into conflict with already held and contradictory
beliefs in a strategic culture. Finally, elite confirmation is necessary for a change in strategic
culture to be accepted into society. Berger states that strategic culture is a “negotiated reality,”
discussed and decided upon among a nation’s elites. Because of this, elites act as the
gatekeepers as to whether or not changes to strategic culture are in line with the reality that they
previously set forth.149

What Role does Strategic Culture have in Tailoring Policy?
Jack Snyder, the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at
Columbia University, was among one of the first to suggest that strategic culture could play an
influential role in predicting the nuclear strategy of opponents. In his study on Soviet nuclear
strategy, his analysis declared that because, “elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to
security-military affairs,” that, “a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with
regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level
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of ‘cultural’ rather than mere policy.”150 By researching these influences upon Soviet culture,
Snyder concluded that the Soviet military, influenced from a history of insecurity and
authoritarian control, “exhibited a preference for the preemptive, offensive use of force.”151 This
analysis proved correct, as seen through Russia’s declared nuclear force doctrine of “escalate to
de-escalate,” in which Russia would use nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict
preemptively in order achieve their strategic objective, and then de-escalate the conflict.152
This analysis of Russian nuclear policy can readily correspond to other cultures and how
they make their decisions regarding WMD. While Snyder’s thoughts on Soviet culture
influencing its nuclear policy was among the first studies in strategic culture, the field has since
expanded, offering fuller and better insights into the mechanisms that influence state strategic
decision making. Kerry Kartchner has observed that strategic culture is essential to
understanding another state’s WMD decision-making for three reasons. Firstly, he recognizes
that research into strategic culture as a research program is vital to formulating and implementing
U.S. national security and foreign policy.153 Strategic culture, in its essence, can help bridge the
gap between the previous lack of understanding into how opponents reason. Chair of the
Department of International Affairs at Texas A&M University Valerie Hudson stated:
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“differences in moral reasoning based on culture may skew traditional assumptions of rationalchoice theory.”154
Secondly, in conjunction with the Sun Tzu quote used earlier within this report,
Kartchner notes the importance for strategists to “know one’s enemy.”155 This point is essential
because it does not merely relate to how a single opponent may formulate policy or other
strategic decisions. Instead, strategic culture can also provide insights about how others (e.g.
allies and neutral nations) will react to state power, assurances and mutual-defense treaties, and
the degree to which they will have faith in the United States. Hypothetically, if a nation were to
attempt to create an international coalition to take on a problem or opponent (either by sanctions,
force, or negotiations), strategic culture can provide policymakers with a framework to achieve
an appropriate solution and plan of action.
Finally, when a group or state decides that it wishes to pursue or proliferate WMDs, they
“often justify their policies and actions in cultural terms.”156 Strategic culture is a useful tool to
understand these decisions because it can help identify the influences that shape the leadership’s
thought processes and makes it easier to predict strategic behavior. By using strategic culture, the
United States will be able to understand why a nation chooses to pursue WMDs, whether it be
for legitimacy purposes; in response to a national tragedy, as a bargaining tool, etc. Furthermore,
it is essential that this examination of strategic culture contain a unique focus on the perspective
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of the state’s leadership, because the U.S. emphasis should be on countering these weapons, and
not merely attempting to explain another culture’s society.
In his framework for analyzing strategic culture and WMD, Kartchner recognizes that
strategic culture can have a profound effect on the ways in which U.S. leadership can create
tailored nuclear policies which take into account how other cultures make decisions regarding
WMD. These cultural decisions include adhering to international norms, acquiring WMD,
proliferating WMD, and using WMD.157 By analyzing these subsections of the overall
framework laid out by Kartchner, one can begin to make the links between strategic culture and
tailoring deterrence policy, citing them as a “template for human action.”158
A model for analysis applies to each of these subsections, allowing one to understand a
country’s likelihood to implement these decisions regarding WMD. This model consists of three
predispositions which must be in place for a country to enact these strategic policies. One, an
action must be deemed “rational” within the system defined by that case study’s strategic culture.
Rationality in this sense means that the costs and benefits of an action are deemed acceptable or
bearable, and this action must be endorsed by the members who hold that strategic culture.159
Second, any action must be deemed appropriate by the holders of a certain strategic culture as,
“enabling the group, organization, or state to achieve culturally endorsed outcomes.”160 If actions
concerning WMD are seen to improve a particular culture’s standing, or enable the group to new
heights, then it may be more likely that they will pursue that action.
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Third and finally, the means and ends of any action regarding WMD must be consistent
with the values and “repertoire or palette” emanating in that specific culture.161 What is
important to note is that any given culture can have completely different responses, thoughts, and
palettes from each of these subsections, which makes the study of strategic culture so important.
If the United States would not pursue a certain type of action regarding WMD because it is
deemed “irrational,” it does not mean that another culture would not have a different
interpretation of morality, or threshold for punishment, when it comes to those same decisions.
International norm adherence describes the extent to which a country would comply and
accept international law and common notions of acceptable behavioral. Kartchner remarks that
international norms are both, “the explicit values” recorded in international law and nonproliferation regimes, as well as “implicit assumptions, values, and rules underlying international
attitudes toward WMD, such as the nuclear taboo.”162 Norm adherence is the first factor to note
when researching a country’s strategic culture and WMD, because a culture with a predisposition
to break these norms is more likely to pursue and possibly use nuclear weapons. Also, there are
strong cultural indicators, such as a preference for, “rejecting, ignoring, or flouting such norms,”
which allow for the closer study and prediction of state behavior regarding WMD.163
Secondly, if a country decides to break with international norms concerning WMD, it is
then important to note the cultural influences which encourage that state to acquire WMD. The
root of most cultures to acquire WMD stems from “domestic sources of motivation,” where
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culture is filtered through “recent experiences.”164 Most often, as Kartchner notes, nearly every
state that has decided to pursue WMD acquisition has occurred in, “the immediate aftermath of
some national defeat, humiliation, or other crisis.”165 Large shocks, defeats, or embarrassments
to a nation often change its strategic calculus and thinking within the leadership. By acquiring
WMD, a state may believe that it will be able to avoid any similar national crisis in the future.
Thirdly, by using strategic culture, one may be able to indicate a state’s likelihood to
transfer or proliferate WMDs to a third party. Once again noting a state’s lack of desire to
comply with international norms, or determination to oppose them, a state or culture may seek to
transfer and proliferate WMD. A culture’s threat environment or isolationism makes it more
prone to do this. By arming third-party groups such as terrorist organizations or rogue states, a
country may be able to either counterbalance opposition alliances or even receive funding
through WMD or ballistic missile sales if they find themselves cut off from the rest of the world
economically.166 While noting that these courses of action are pragmatic, one can also find a
cultural perspective in a state’s decision to transfer or proliferate WMD, by how they justify it
within their leadership and society.
Finally, strategic culture can give better insight as to when a nation or group would allow
for the usage of WMDs. While most would think that nuclear weapons and WMD are only for
offensive and defensive uses, there are other options for use that certain cultures might deem
acceptable. For example, merely maintaining, but not utilizing, nuclear weapons for a
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“traditional Cold War deterrence” purpose might be deemed appropriate for some cultures, as
seen through the 1983 U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace.167
To further link the connection between using WMDs and strategic culture, Barry
Schneider identified five reasons as to why a state may choose to utilize WMDs; “To fracture an
allied coalition;” “To attack or defeat the United States at home;” “[To] defeat or decimate a U.S.
expeditionary force;” “Secure an endgame;” and, “To avenge the defeat of a regime.”168 Cultures
that are more prone to act in these manners must be further analyzed to establish a predictive
framework that U.S. policymakers can utilize to tailor WMD strategy.
While not an exact science, strategic culture has enough credibility to be taken seriously
as a research program or framework to be utilized by those who influence and develop U.S.
security policy. One should note that this field of study is not meant to be a replacement for
deterrence policy, but rather act as a supplemental tool to gain insight into the minds and likely
behavior of the leadership of nations and groups around the globe. Valerie Hudson states: “We
may not be able to predict choice and construction of a particular response by a particular
member of the culture, but we can know what is on the shelf and what is not.”169
It is essential that U.S. leadership seriously considers strategic culture as a tool or
framework on which to base U.S. tailored deterrence strategy. However, as more discoveries are
made within this field about what it can offer to U.S. policymakers, there is still room for more
research on how it can play a role. By applying the strategic framework to historical case studies,
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one may be better able to provide explanations and predictions for threat anticipations,
negotiating styles, surprise attacks, and decisions to acquire and utilize WMDs.170

Review
This chapter has described how strategic culture became an important consideration after
the need for a new strategy became apparent as the threat environment evolved following the end
of the Cold War era. Strategic culture at its core is the attempt to understand how an opponent
makes strategic decisions based upon key cultural influences. Factors such as geography, past
experiences, spirituality, and myths and symbols within a culture will affect how it views itself
and the world. The focus within strategic culture is aimed at the elite leadership of a nation or
group, because they are the ones who are most likely to define and sustain a cultural narrative, as
well as make any strategic decisions.
This chapter also examined what role strategic culture can play in tailoring a deterrence
strategy towards an opponent. Past studies, such as Jack Snyder’s analysis of Soviet strategic
culture, and its preference to use preemptive force, set a precedent that strategic culture can be a
practical field of study. Kartchner furthered this application of applying strategic culture to state
WMD behavior by establishing certain requirements that a state must generally adhere to. These
requirements are: whether or not adhering to international norms, acquiring, transferring, or
using WMD are deemed rational within a case study’s strategic culture; and whether these
decisions are confirmed by the leadership that it will enable a group; and are consistent with the
values that emanate from a culture.
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Now that the argument has been put forth that that strategic culture should be applied in
the development and application of U.S. deterrence policy, this paper will analyze Iranian
strategic culture, and offer policy options as to how the United States can tailor a strategy to
address the threat from that nation. It is important to note that this report does not advocate that
strategic culture become a replacement for current U.S. deterrence policy, but to instead act as a
viable element that policymakers can use to reaffirm or challenge existing and potential
strategies.

60

IRANIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
“We are Hussein’s men, and this is our epoch. In devotion we are the slaves of the Imam; Our
name is ‘zealot’ and our title ‘martyr.’”171
Poems by the first Safavid king, Shāh Ismā‘il (1501-1524)

Throughout Iran’s vibrant domestic history and regular interactions with outside powers,
it has acquired a unique culture that influences the strategic choices that it makes. By analyzing
these underlying societal factors, one will be better able to grasp the Iranian strategic culture.
This chapter will provide an examination of the relevant history of Iran; how the country
generally identifies itself; the dominant cultural values that are pervasive in Iranian society; what
norms characterize Iran’s behavior; and how Iran’s strategic culture has affected its rationality
and policy on acquiring, proliferating, and utilizing WMD.

Iranian History
Contributing editor of Foreign Policy magazine Christian Caryl once described Iran as
an, “odd fusion of Islam and late twentieth-century revolutionary politics.”172 However, there is
an experience that began in ancient times that has led to the current Islamic state. Mr. Willis
Stanley, an expert on Iranian strategic culture from the Institute of Public Policy, describes the
scope of Iranian civilization as a, “continuity of human history in and around the Iranian plateau
that extends from the emergence of Neolithic society and agriculture around 8000 BCE through
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to the present day.”173 Throughout this period, there have been certain trends that have remained
pervasive in Iranian society; absolute kingship, and the concept of Valayat-e Faquih (rule of the
jurisprudent).174
Stanley further asserts that despite the immensely long history of Iran, it is most
constructive to begin the analysis of Iranian strategic culture with the formation of the
Achaemenid Persian Empire established by Cyrus the Great in 559 BCE.175 By co-opting elites
of different tribes and conquered enemies, Cyrus was able to establish a bureaucracy in which
the ruler practiced absolute kingship, and was able to exercise decision making with god-granted
authority. This tradition of a “god-granted authority” ruling over the Persian people continued
throughout time and included the rise and fall of many empires that conquered the lands of Iran,
e,g, Alexander the Great in 331 BCE, the Parthian Empire in 163 BCE, and the Sassanian empire
400 years later.176 The establishment of these various empires and different rulers definitely
contributed to the deep insecurity felt by Iranian natives regarding the influence of outside
powers who would conquer and attempt to impose their cultural values on to Iranian society.
The next great transformation in Iranian society came in the mid-seventh century CE with
the fall of the Sassanid Empire to the incoming Umayyad armies of Islam. Up until this point,
Zoroastrianism was the primary religion in Iran, which had been institutionalized by the
Sassanians. They had also established a caste system, which separated persons of “low birth,”
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and at the same time solidified the powers of the elites.177 Islam was able to take such a strong
hold on Iranian society due to the current weakness of the Sassanian Empire, and because of the
benefits, e.g. lower taxes and fair treatment between social classes, that Islam offered those who
were willing to subscribe to its membership and devotion.178
During this time, the great schism of Islam occurred. This had to do with the intra-Arab
matter, which attempted to decide the rightful successor of Muhammad as the leader of the
Islamic religion. This conflict led to civil war. Those who believed that the followers closest to
Mohammad should become the secular leaders of the religion became the Sunnis (and were the
Umayyads). Those who wished to follow Mohammad’s successor via his bloodline, his brother
in law Ali, became known as the Shi’a (which means the partisans of Ali).179 When Ali was
murdered, his son Hussein sought to rise against the Sunni Umayyad caliphate, and his followers
were slaughtered. This death of Hussein has been forever cemented in the psyche of the Shi’a
branch of Islam, and has created a reverence for what is known as martyrdom, to die in a stand
for their faith.180
As a defeated political movement, the Shi’a were forced to live in a society while
resenting those who ruled over them, and in whom they did not believe. Instead of looking to a
political figure for leadership, the Shi’a instead believe in the power of the Imam, who is seen as
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a religious leader descended from Ali.181 This insecurity in government can be seen in the
modern day with the existence of two leadership elements acting within Iran, a parliamentary
body and a clerical body.
It would take centuries, multiple changes in rulership, and invasions (such as the Abbasid
dynasty and the Mongol conquests) for Iran to begin to establish its own national identity, this
time in Shi’a structure. In the 16th century CE, the Safavid empire established itself in what is
now modern-day Azerbaijan and began to take over the greater part of Iran, as well as the Iraqi
provinces of Baghdad and Mosul.182
The leader of this dynasty was recognized as a Shah, and established Shi’a Islam as the
predominant religion. In a fashion that was in step with Iranian tradition, the Shahs would
exercise absolute kingship over Iranian policy. In addition to this massive change in the law of
the land, Shi’a Imams were also able to establish a caste system which allowed the faith elite to
create obligatory taxes and other tools of power separate from the actual government.183 Iran
eventually united with the Qajar Shah dynasty, which would continue to rule from 1796 to 1925.
At this point in Iranian history, responding to and resisting physical threats from outside
influencers was a top priority for the Iranian elite. Ottomans, Indians, Russians, and a contrary
Sunni government forming in what would eventually be known as Saudi Arabia began to place
pressure on Iran in geopolitical rivalries. This paranoia of outside influence exacerbated itself
further by rising western influences in the region, primarily by Great Britain and its allies, as
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well as the Russians; These powers worked to place Iran into their respective spheres of
influence.
This fear of westernization led to the Constitutionalist Revolution, which sought to
establish a Parliament (Majlis) which represented the merchant elite of Iranian society. However,
this was further complicated for the ulama (religious elites), when in 1925, Reza Shah Pahlavi
attempted to modernize Iran, which gave western powers much more power and influence within
the Persian state. Because of this, the ulama began to experience a loss of control and state
influence, and the Shah began to appropriate other aspects of traditional Iranian industries such
as trade. During World War II, the Shah was exiled, and his son would ultimately become the
next ruler of Iran.
This suspicion and acrimony between the Shah-controlled state and the ulama came to a
boil when the Shah consolidated his power in 1953, with the help of the U.S. and British
intelligence services, and began to further insert himself into spheres where the ulama
traditionally ruled.184 In many cases, the reforms made by the Shah (known as the white
revolution) directly opposed conservative Iranian behaviors by accepting Western excesses such
as the relaxation of clothing restrictions for women and the reformation of the educational
system.185 In response, the clerics began to sow the seeds of revolt within Iranian Society.
This conflict eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, when the clerical elite was
able to establish another supreme leader of their own, this time acting under the justification and
authority of Islam. A new constitution was created which established three branches of
government (executive, legislative, and judiciary), but with the critical caveat of religious
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oversight.186 The work of this new government has been in a constant state of flux, as all policy
decisions and candidates must be vetted by the clerical elite.187

Iranian Identity
The Iranian identity can be seen as the view that the nation is a protector and leader of
Shi’a Islam around the world, influenced strongly by a mix of internal and external paranoia.
Throughout Iran’s history, it has continuously been susceptible to outside powers that have
attempted to change Iranian culture through blatant aggression and from the inside out. In recent
history, this was worsened by attempts by western powers to change and exploit Iranian society
and resources to benefit their own policy goals. This has made Iran extremely wary.
Furthermore, Iran borders or is in the vicinity of many countries which it deeply opposes,
making it take a hardline and asymmetric approach regarding its foreign policy and powerprojection decisions.
The fact that Iran has a rich and compelling history that spans thousands of years is the
source of a self-realized legitimacy as a central player on the world stage. Willis Stanley asserts
that, “Iranian nationalism was born and flourished alongside the development of civilization and
empire.”188 Even during occupation by other entities, Iranian elites were able to survive and
continue an Iranian national identity by cooperating and utilizing already established
bureaucracies to assist and co-opt the conquering empires.189

186

Stanley, 148.

187

Stanley, 138.

188

Stanley, 151.

189

Stanley, 150.
66

The modern Iranian regime uses its Shi’a ideology and history of oppression to identify
itself as being apart from others.190 Shi’a Islam was a perfect fit for the Iranians due to its ability
to help establish a clerical caste system (reminiscent of previous established Sassanian systems
under Zoroastrianism), complete with the recognition of an absolute ruler.191 Shi’a Islam plays a
critical role in the formulation of Iranian policy, due to the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, in which
any laws passed by Iranian parliament has to receive the approval of the clerical elite.192
The Shi’a sect fits perfectly with the Iranian narrative of exploitation and persecution
from outside powers and influences. Throughout Iran’s history, those who practiced Shi’a Islam
were driven underground in the practice of their faith and recognized different political
leadership than the foreign rulers who were occupying Iran at the time.
Iran’s hostility towards the west evolved over a number of years but reached its peak
during the Iranian revolution and ultimately United States’ backing of the Saddam government
during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. This opposition to the new and radical Islamic regime
solidified the opinion within Iran that the United States and its allies are committed to the failure
of the Islamic Republic.193 The Shi’a leadership galvanizes popular support, opinion and
sentiment against the west, and the United State in particular, by employing religious-based
epithets such as “the Great Satan” to demonize and define any enemy as intensely evil.194
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Iran also seeks to solidify its Shi’a identity by backing other governments and utilizing
proxies that help export its ideology and project power, often putting it at direct odds with Sunni
governments which surround Iran, not to mention the state of Israel. Iran has supported terrorist
Shi’a organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi rebels, which have destabilized
the region and keep it in a state of continuous conflict. Consequently, Iran has an extremely
hostile and mistrustful rival relationship with many local regional powers.
The Iranian leadership propagates animosity with the U.S. whenever possible in order to
bring the people together via a common hatred of a common enemy and maintain even tighter
control over the society using fear of an evil and predatory “other.” Furthermore, Israel has often
conducted direct military and cyber strikes against Iranian facilities, forces, and allies. In
response, Iran has maintained a bellicose criticism of Israel, has called for the extinction of the
Jewish state, and its military officials have recently stated that it can wipe Israel off of the
map.195

Iranian Cultural Values
Utilizing the 6-D Hofstede model on national culture, one can better understand the
dominant cultural values that are pervasive within Iranian society. The 6-D Hofstede model was
originally created by the renowned cultural analyst, professor Geert Hofstede, and focused on
explaining how values in the workplace are influenced by culture.196 This model has evolved to
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become applicable worldwide in academic settings and is accepted as a tool that can be readily
used in the analysis of strategic culture.
These six dimensions of the 6-D Hofstede model (Power Distance, Individualism,
Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, and Indulgence) can give relevant
insights into how Iranian values differ from other cultures, which is central to understanding how
cultural values impact decision making on a strategic level. Each of these dimensions is rated on
a scale from 1 to 100, and the number indicates how likely a society is to adhere to a particular
value in everyday life.
Power distance identifies the attitudes held by a society regarding whether or not
individuals are equal.197 With a score of 58 out of 100, Iran is designated to be a hierarchical
society in which most individuals have a designated place. The score coincides with Iran’s long
tradition of establishing multiple caste systems. It is clear that the designated leaders of Iranian
society are the holders of its strategic culture, and that the populace generally accepts this
environment as fair and acceptable. This could reasonably explain why the leaders in this society
think of themselves as higher status than others, giving them unquestionable authority and the
ability to place their policy objectives in positions of high importance.
The Individualism score represents “the degree of interdependence a society maintains
among its members.”198 In this category, Iran scores a 41 out of 100, indicating that it is a
collectivist society. In collectivist societies, there is an emphasis on the concept of “losing face”
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for offenses and failures committed.199 Additionally, nepotism occurs in the process of inclusion
for groups.
Regarding Iranian strategic culture, the fact that it is a collectivist society plays a role in
the structure of Iranian leadership, as well as how Iranians may act in according to their values.
For example, with an emphasis on the loss of face, it may influence how Iranians negotiate deals,
or whether or not they might back down from a particular policy goal or objective. Furthermore,
it adds to the theory that Iranian strategic culture is held by the societal elite, who seek to
consolidate their power and dictate the national narrative through the use of close relatives
(nepotism), and those of the same or higher class.
The Masculinity score refers to the amount that a society is “driven by competition,
achievement and success, with success defined by the winner.”200 A lower score on this scale
indicates that society is feminine, meaning that values in society are more focused on quality of
life and caring for others. The Hofstede scale compresses this down to two issues of motivation:
“wanting to be the best (masculine) or liking what you do (feminine).”201 With a score of 43, Iran
is considered to be leaning as a feminine society. With the implementation of the caste system,
Iranians are designed to be in one class for their entire lives. Because of this, many would
consider life in Iran to be a situation that they must make the most out of and understand that
there is not much room for social or economic mobility.
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Fourthly, uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which a society is accepting or anxious
about “ambiguous or unknown situations.”202 Countries prone to avoiding uncertainty frequently
establish strict rules and codes of behavior and are unwelcoming of new ideas and behavior that
they find eccentric or non-conformist. With a score of 59 out of 100, Iran is determined to have a
rather strong penchant for avoiding these types of situations.
Iran’s strategic culture is affected by their high uncertainty avoidance, and by their
preference to hedge their bets against the future. One example is the way that Iran has conducted
its nuclear activities over the years. Iran has never overtly or aggressively pursued a specific enddate to acquire a nuclear weapon. Instead, it has consistently pushed forward with development
in small increments. Even if at times Iran has been amenable to temporary halts in their program
(as such with the J.C.P.O.A.), they have still been able to maintain certain abilities in case they
would ever need to break out and build up a nuclear arsenal quickly.
Fifth, long term orientation attempts to explain how “every society has to maintain some
links with its past while dealing with the challenges of the present and future,” and how society
prioritizes these goals.203 Societies that score low in this dimensions often attempt to preserve
and uphold traditions and norms, and (similarly to uncertainty avoidance) view societal change
with distrust.204 Iran scores the lowest on this level with a 14 out of 100, categorizing it as a very
normative society.
Hofstede describes cultures with a low long-term orientation as possessing a “great
respect for traditions, a relatively small propensity to save for the future, and a focus on
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achieving quick results.”205 Iran has exhibited these traits in its strategic policy. One example is
its propensity to back organizations such as terrorist groups who operate under Shi’a religious
beliefs and codes of behavior. Also, it is sensible that Iran has been willing to switch its nuclear
program on and off, depending on what near-term benefits and results in those decisions create.
The P.A.S.C.C. final report on assessing the Iranian compliance with the J.C.P.O.A. asserted that
for the time being, “there is no indication that Iran intends to resume pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability,” and that they have put their nuclear weapons program “on ice.”206 However,
coinciding interestingly with Iran’s long-term orientation, it is possible that at the moment, Iran
is receiving more benefits than consequences by adhering to the deal, and that it may choose to
resume a nuclear weapons capability as soon as it becomes practical to do so.
Finally, the indulgence score measures the degree “to which people try to control their
desires and impulses.”207 With a score of 40 out of 100, Iran is designated to be a country of
restraint, being more prone to pessimism and cynicism.208 This pessimism had been engrained
into Iranian culture throughout its history, as expressed by the idea of an assault of Iranian “high
culture” from outside powers.209 While generally isolated and mistrusting its neighboring
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nations, Iran has a particularly negative and pessimistic outlook on the United States and Israel
(the “Great Satan” and “Fake State” respectively).210
This pessimistic cultural orientation affects Iranian negotiating behavior, by affecting
how it accepts is willing to engage in a deal where both parties trust each other on “good faith”
standards. These perceptions of mistrust against the United States have been further exacerbated
by the United States’ withdrawal from the J.C.P.O.A. and may indicate that in the future, it may
be extremely challenging to reconstruct or reinstate the negotiation environment that led to the
original deal. The pessimistic traits ingrained in Iran’s culture echoed in the J.C.P.O.A.
negotiations, as negotiators considered the words of Ayatollah Ali Khameini, who stated that any
American leadership (regardless of administration) was bent on conspiring against any
achievements of Iran.211

Iranian Norms
The norms which this study seeks to uncover are related to how Iran’s strategic culture
affects how Iran perceives and behaves in relation to conflict, the international system, the utility
of violence, and the laws of war. In the study for the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts
for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (P.A.S.C.C.), which assessed Iran’s compliance
with the J.C.P.O.A., Nima Baghdadi concluded that the primary cultural orientations that played
a central role in Iranian negotiating behavior were pessimism, pragmatism, and honor.212
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However, one can link these orientations to other norms, such as overall strategic decision
making, and behaviors within the international environment.
Iran views honor as an inherent Islamic value, which emphasizes its sense of, “national
dignity, independence, achievements, and a powerful need for those virtues of Iranian
civilization to be recognized and respected by other nations.”213 This gives Iran a uniquely elitist
outlook on international affairs, in which their way of conducting strategic operations are above
other nation’s virtues. Also, recent Iranian memory of lethargic international attention to its
people during the Iran-Iraq War (when Saddam Hussein was a clear aggressor and used chemical
weapons) left Iran mistrusting of the international order. This experience gave Iran the
impression that the world order based itself on power, not reciprocity.214 This experience also
connects to Iranian decision-making regarding its nuclear program. If other countries in the
world can achieve an elite status by implementing and sustaining a nuclear weapons program,
why shouldn’t the Iranians (who believe themselves to have a superior culture) have that same
right?
While pessimistic about the international order, Iran is still pragmatic in its involvement
with multilateral institutions. Iran will use forums such as the United Nations and other
Intergovernmental Organizations to give itself legitimacy on a world stage and advance its
economic development, while also opposing resolutions and other ideas which are not in
accordance with their belief system and national aims.215
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Other examples of Iranian pragmatism in international affairs are its heroic flexibility,
“prudent deceit,” and strategic patience.216 Heroic flexibility puts a practical reality between
ideas that Iran is obsessed with ideals such as martyrdom, but also being sober in how they
utilize it in conflict. While most observers would assume that Iran’s bombastic rhetoric about
martyrdom (as seen in the Iran-Iraq war) implies that it would be a strategic tool, heroic
flexibility instead proposes that martyrdom can be avoided, if it means that Iran can gain further
long-term benefits from a short-term loss.217
Iran also practices the principle of taqiyyah, or prudent deceit, in international politics.
Taqiyyah is the allowance within Islam for one to deny religious belief and practice in the face of
persecution.”218 In line with the Shi’as experience of being persecuted and pushed underground,
Schmeul Barr describes the practice as, “taqiyyah is justifiable in light of the fact that historically
Shi’ites, as a minority group were subject to persecution. Such a non-ideological pragmatism
rests on the rational notion of expediency (maslaha) or decision-making according to an
assessment of the damage that would otherwise incur upon the community.”219 This concept was
seen in practice during the Iran-Iraq war, when Ayatollah Khomeini accepted UNSC 598, which
brought an end to the war. Even though it went against the Islamic Republic’s ideals of fighting
until victory and celebrating the martyrdom that the war brought, Iran was able to accept a
logical and pragmatic choice which allowed itself to regroup and continue building the nation.
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Strategic patience is also a norm in Iranian behavior on the world stage. Strategic
patience describes the ability to withstand pressures from outside sources until a likable outcome
or solution presents itself. Iran has a long history of strategic patience, whether it be in the form
of negotiations, acceptance of defeat or conquest by outsiders, or even the development of its
nuclear program. During the lead up to the J.C.P.O.A. negotiations, Iran was experiencing ill
effects from substantial weight of sanctions imposed from the United Nations Security Council,
that were resulting from its nuclear program. Even though Iran’s economy was suffering,
President Rouhani was able to wait until his legitimacy as president grew and nuclear program
had advanced so far that Iran had more chips with which to bargain. This gave them the
flexibility to extract certain concessions from the U.N., such as their ballistic missile program
and uranium enrichment capability.220 It is extremely likely that Iran will continue to implement
strategic patience as a tool in future international relations.221
The final orientation prevalent in Iranian norms is its sense of honor. The concept of
honor is prevalent in Islam, and is connected through Quranic traditions, prayers, and notions.222
Honor in this sense encompasses dignity, integrity, and consistency through all aspects of Iranian
life, including, “individual, political, social, economic, judicial, ethical, and familial
commitments.”223 Baghdadi notes while connecting Iranian honor with foreign policy that,
“Iran’s security calculus is not always based on typical realist inputs such as power disparity.
Security policy can also be about assuring the consistency of the story that a collective agent tells
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itself about who it is. Satisfying nuanced self-identity needs can be costly and seemingly at odds
with rational strategic objectives prescribed by realist thinking, but is often treated as a core
national interest.”224 What Baghdadi means by this is that Iranian security policy is not always
dictated by a sense of realism and “western viewed” rationality. Even if the result of a foreign
policy decision may be “costlier” than if avoided, Iranians may instead choose to assure a
consistency within their narrative, as keeping their honor alive is considered as a core national
interest.
Iranians use their close-knit group of elites on the world stage to implement policy
decisions. As described earlier, having an exclusive group of leaders (that are often given status
through nepotism or birthright) means that policies that Iran enacts are not always, and do not
need to be, in line with popular public opinion.225 Furthermore, this plays into the fact that Iran
views itself as an elite civilization by enabling its leaders to enact policies that they alone see fit.

Beliefs in WMD
Author of The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign
Policy, Jacques Hymans noted that the decision for a country to pursue nuclear weapons is
heavily weighted, and the decisions solidify within those cultural identities that are present
within the leadership.226 Kerry Kartchner also asserted that when regarding WMD, a state is
more likely to reject or adhere to international norms, acquire WMD, transfer or proliferate
WMD, and use WMD if “it is deemed rational within the system of shared meaning defined by
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the prevailing strategic culture;” “seen as enabling the group, organization, or state to achieve
culturally endorsed outcomes;” or, the “ends and means for [this] outcome are deemed
appropriate by the keepers or holders of that strategic culture.”227 In the case of Iran, gaining a
nuclear capability has been rationalized in the culture, even though it took a painful national
experience to affect and form its strategic view of WMDs.228 For example, during the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980, Saddam Hussein utilized chemical weapons which resulted in a gruesome loss of
lives for the Iranians. Also, Iran became further jaded in relation to the international community
because of its unsuccessful ability or willingness to curb or condemn the attacks. This horrific
experience led to the Iranians to pursue a WMD capability.
Initially, the Iranian’s would not have pursued chemical weapons due to their Islamic
belief that the prophet Mohammad opposed poison.229 However, the Iranian Supreme Leader
declared that through taqiyya, it would be considered rational within their strategic culture, thus
setting a precedent for the future Iranian biological and nuclear capabilities.230
In addition to rationality, gaining a WMD capability (especially a nuclear one) would
give the Iranian elite the status that they believe they deserve, based upon the identity that they
have narrated to their society throughout history. Iranian President Rouhani wrote in 2013, “To
us, mastering the atomic fuel cycle and generating nuclear power is as much about diversifying
our energy resources as it is about who Iranians are as a nation, our demand for dignity and
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respect and our consequent place in the world.”231 By achieving this level of technology,
alongside their largest standing army in the middle east (with 540,000 regular and paramilitary
troops), Iran would become the preeminent power in the region.232 Also, it is likely that Iran’s
history of distrust for outside powers, and confrontations with the west, would also incentivize
them to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. If Iran were to obtain the ability to produce nuclear
weapons, it is believed by the leadership that it would cause the United States and other outside
powers to reevaluate their Middle Eastern policy, and possibly prevent them from interfering in
the region.233
Finally, the ends justify the means by Iranian strategic culture as the pursuit of these new
capabilities is in alignment with the practice of taqiyyah. The Iranians are willing to bend Islamic
law, as they have been seen to do in cases they deem fit, in the face of threats to their national
security. Because they were threatened by outside sources and persecuted for their culture, they
were able to bend the religious law to their will, to give themselves “equal footing” when facing
adversaries.
Strategic patience played an immense role in Iran’s nuclear program, by its willingness to
turn the program on and off as it saw fit. I.R.G.C. commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari
stated in 2017 that the limitations of Iranian ballistic missile technology are a political choice,
instead of a technological one.234 It is entirely possible that the Iranians can put their nuclear
program “on ice” with the J.C.P.O.A. because they see short-term benefits that they can “cash
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in” on, while other aspects of their nuclear weapons capability evolve, such as their space launch
and ballistic missile technology. At times when regional and international circumstances are
unfavorable, the Iranians can seek a future time which would be more advantageous to advance a
policy or their nuclear program. General Jafari claimed, “Today, the range of our missiles, as the
policies of Iran’s Supreme Leader dictate, are limited to 2,000 kilometers, even though we are
capable of increasing this range.”235
In adherence to international norms, Iran has shown that while it takes part in
international organizations, it is not likely to comply with every ruling made, especially if it is
against the national interest of Iran. While being a signatory of the N.P.T., Iran has shown in
multiple instances its willingness to go against the safeguards in place to further its nuclear
program. Because of the cultural indicators that Iran possesses that that makes it more prone to
break with international norms concerning WMDs, Iran is categorized as a more at-risk state to
pursue nuclear weapons than others.
Iran is more likely to acquire WMDs as the military and civilian infrastructure (and its
population/society as a whole) has experienced so much devastation and heartbreak, in the hopes
that such acquisition might prohibit that experience from happening again in the future. The
outside powers that are in a geopolitical rivalry with Iran give further incentive for it to acquire
WMDs, as it perceives these other countries as existential opponents to its long-term goals. As
seen in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s presentation on Project Amad, Iran has set
clear goals to achieve a nuclear capability.
While there is no evidence that Iran has currently acquired nuclear weapons, there is an
indication that it could transfer or proliferate upon acquisition, if it should have the desire to do
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so. As stated earlier in this report, a country is more likely to be driven to proliferate if it has a
particular threat environment or is isolationist. Past experience and the current geopolitical
environment would incentivize Iran to use any resources it can to its advantage, including
asymmetric tools like terrorism. Iran has already proved itself willing to utilize terrorist groups to
achieve strategic objectives, so it is not unreasonable to suggest that they would continue this
behavior by transferring or proliferating WMDs.
Finally, Iran’s willingness to obtain, use, and proliferate WMDs is dependent upon what
its strategic goals are at the time. However, there is a common precedent set by clerical
leadership in Iran that nuclear weapons would not be tolerable under Islamic law. Supreme
leader Ali Khameini has issued a fatwa (religious edict), banning nuclear weapons. It states that,
“the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that Iran
shall never acquire these weapons.”236 In a meeting with officials of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Khameini also noted that, “the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and
theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the
proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.”237 Whether or not this
religious thinking subjugates itself to taqiyya (the bending of Islamic laws for the survival of the
regime) is still up for question.
However, as stated earlier in this report, while some nations would look for WMD to be
used either for offensive or defensive purposes, they can also have other purposes. For example,
Iran could develop and possess nuclear weapon to simply deter an adversary such as Israel,
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without ever having to use them. Iran could also use a WMD capability to serve as a counter to
the United States by inhibiting its mobility in economic chokepoints in the regional waterways.
Also, any WMDs that Iran has or might obtain could be useful in negotiations to limit sanctions,
or to strike favorable deals with international powers. Anthony Cain has identified two reasons
why Iran would deem a WMD attack appropriate.238 The first would be, “in a defensive response
to an external threat, or retaliation for an attack.”239 Secondly, Iran could use them for an
offensive operation, likely through a terrorist organization. This would be enacted “to energize a
global or, at least, a regional Islamic bid for power.”240

Review
Iran’s extensive history, cultural values, self-identity, and norms are all determining
factors on how its specific culture dictates decisions Iran makes on a strategic scale. By
analyzing Iran’s strategic culture, one gains better insight into the nuances affecting Iran’s policy
decisions on how or when it is moral to acquire and use WMDs; what sort of thresholds of
damage it is willing to suffer; and, the other cultural influences that play a role in its national
decision-making ability. By creating this framework, and seeking to understand its implications,
the United States will be better off in attempting to create a new policy framework to meet the
current and future Iranian threat.
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TAILORING DETERRENCE POLICY TOWARDS IRAN
“Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations,
history, networks, relationships, and all the dimensions of human political behavior, on a scale
broader and deeper than today’s.”241
Dr. Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence – Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 7, 2004

This report has described the current Iranian threat to the United States. It has also
examined the evolution of American deterrence policy, which has culminated in a fourth wave
that emphasizes an understanding of cultural indicators that influence an opponent’s decisionmaking process. Finally, this report provided an overview of the primary Iranian strategic culture
in order to identify the variables that can be applied to the new deterrence framework. While
these variables are not an infallible means to formulate U.S. deterrence policy, the importance
that strategic culture must play as a tool for the future of deterrence policy is clear.
Even though there is no evidence that Iran has currently acquired nuclear weapons, it
continues to enhance its I.C.B.M. capability. In traditional thinking, a country would not pursue
this aptitude unless it planned to equip the missile with a nuclear payload, which would give
them a strategic counter to the United States or others. Chief of General Staff of the Iranian
Armed Forces, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, further noted Iran’s desire to increase its
developing missile capabilities by saying, “Our defense capabilities, including missile power, is
by no means negotiable and cannot be discussed with anyone.”242 However, going against this
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conventional wisdom, Iran is less likely to use their I.C.B.M.s for a nuclear attack, and is instead
more likely to use tactical missiles to deliver a nuclear payload.243
Because of this, it is essential that the United States still make contingency plans against
an uncertain future, as there are uncertain technologies and capabilities that may arise from Iran.
To tailor a proper deterrence strategy, the United States will need to operate within two
environments: the current state in which Iran has not broken out with nuclear weapons; and
another possible environment if it does in the future. Strategic culture will assist U.S.
policymakers in operating and tailoring deterrence strategies in the pre and post breakout
environments by applying Kartchner’s subsections of a culture’s WMD decision making. The
pre-breakout environment will have to consider a culture’s propensity to not adhere with
international norms concerning WMD acquisition and development and the decisions to acquire
WMD. The post-breakout environment will have to consider the willingness of that actor to
proliferate/transfer WMD technology and, most importantly, its likelihood to utilize WMD.

Pre-Breakout Environment
As noted earlier in this study, Iran is a country prone to break with international norms
and taboos concerning WMD. Since its signing of the N.P.T., Iran has disobeyed multiple
promises and safeguard agreements regarding its nuclear program. In addition, the Israeli
intelligence services have uncovered documents which detail the explicit pursuit of a nuclear
weapon in the early 2000’s.
However, there is currently disagreement among Iran experts about whether or not they
wish to pursue the bomb at this moment.244 There are multiple factions at work within Iran’s
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leadership, whether they are hardliners, pragmatists, or reformers, who are not in complete
agreement.245 It may be that whoever within the leadership has a stronger voice may decide
which WMD path Iran will ultimately pursue. With the U.S. pullout of the J.C.P.O.A., a range of
influences will soon determine which of these leaders will have the most influence on the future
of Iran’s nuclear program. If there is some system that would allow Iran to renegotiate another
beneficial nuclear deal or possibly stay within the parameters of the current one with assistance
from other outside powers (e.g. Russia and/or China), it may choose to continue putting its
nuclear program on ice.246 However, if the United States and its allies continue to exert pressure
on Iran’s economy, it is likely that some Iranian hardliners may take the helm in advocating and
advancing a nuclear capability. In any case, the United States retains options that could utilize
knowledge of Iran’s strategic culture to implement policy decisions during this time in which
Iran has not yet acquired a nuclear weapon. It is important to note that a tailored deterrence
strategy is likely to require a broad range of actions in the implementation of the policy, which
could entail indirect methods such as further sanctions, and military pressure to inhibit a state’s
nuclear ability.

Policy Option: Internal Unrest
There is a possibility of applying pressure to Iran’s leadership structure by influencing
and inciting the civilian population to take or threaten action. Even with some economic relief
given to Iran from the J.C.P.O.A., its economy has still grown significantly worse in the past
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years. In 2017, Radio Farda noted that the average unemployment rate in Iran is 12%, while
unemployment in some cities has reached numbers of up to 60%.247 Also, 33% of Iran’s
population has been reported to be in absolute poverty, while commodity prices are rising
simultaneously.248
Because Iran has a considerable power distance between its leadership and its people,
Iranian elites often pursue policies which are in line with their strategic narrative and focus on
protecting themselves against strategic concerns. The Iranian leadership has expended most of
the economic benefits provided via the J.C.P.O.A. on increased defense spending (ballistic
missile tests, military equipment, and training), further involved the nation in regional conflicts
such as in Yemen and Syria, and expanded its patronage of terrorist proxies.249 In step with the
large power distance between the Iranian population and its leadership, Iran has pursued regional
destabilization instead of seeking domestic relief for its people.
Since January 2018, the Iranian public has demonstrated in nation-wide protests and
other instances of domestic unrest that may indicate that it blames the regime for the U.S.
withdrawal from the J.C.P.O.A., and for the new sanctions imposed upon the country.250 If Iran
reverses direction and does not show good faith in curbing its nuclear program and its general
military build-up, the United States could take a different approach to nuclear policy and attempt
to exacerbate these internal tensions. One way in which the U.S. can pursue this policy is to
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covertly support opposition groups within Iran and the region, use social media, and launch other
propaganda campaigns to sow seeds of doubt and dissatisfaction into the Iranian populace. One
obstacle to the implementation of this policy are the cultural inhibitors that are in place, which
would need to be overcome. As a feminine leaning society, Iranian civilians are more likely to be
accepting of their current standing within the “caste” system and, as such, may not be as prone to
try and initiate regime change. However, strategic culture tends to change with external shocks
inflicted upon a culture, and the United States could accelerate this process by making life
unbearable for Iranian elites and regular civilians via further economic sanctions and pressure. If
Iranian elites choose to spend what little resources they have on military buildup and foreign
involvement, the lower classes in that society may be more likely to try and break from their
norms. This could create cultural changes that ultimately result in a new form of government or
altered policy behavior from the Iranians.
Even if regime change is not yet possible, the United States may at least be able to put
enough pressure on the regime so that it can become more of a moderate actor within the region.

Policy Option: Negotiations
Another path for U.S. nuclear policy towards Iran during the pre-breakout environment
would be the use of strategic culture to gain better insight into Iran’s negotiating styles. Cultural
orientations noted earlier in this report can give U.S. policymakers insight as to how Iran would
react to future negotiations, most notably Iran’s pessimism, pragmatism, and honor. As a
pessimistic nation, Iran believes that great powers such as the United States seek to undermine its
development and interests which are beneficial to it. Therefore, Iran will not likely go into
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negotiations as an act of trust.251 Because of this, Iran is also likely to use any benefits from the
deal to its advantage, as seen through the buildup of its military after the J.C.P.O.A. was enacted.
U.S. policymakers will need to be aware of this reality, in case that any future negotiations
would concede economic benefits that the Iranian leadership would use to boost its power within
the region. Furthermore, the United States should emphasize certain verifiable limits on the
Iranian nuclear program, such as its ability to enrich uranium, and must stipulate 24-hour access
to facilities to ensure that despite a mistrust of the United States, there can be no room for a
breakout capability.
The early roots of Iran’s pragmatism were formulated in the way that ancient Persian
elites would lend their services and bureaucratic institutions to outside powers who had invaded
them in order to keep local culture alive.252 Part of what drove Iran to the negotiating table for
the J.C.P.O.A. was the crushing sanctions set by the international community which threatened
the long term objectives and survival of the regime.253 Furthermore, Iranian strategic patience
allows them the ability to cede their long term goals for significant short-term benefits. The
Iranian ability to go against some of its cultural codes and cooperate with agreements and deals
for short-term benefits over long-term goals is problematic to U.S. policymakers. United States
leadership needs to be aware of these factors so that they can include necessary caveats within
negotiations and agreements that would limit these behaviors.
However, recent history shows that Iran is unlikely to simply bend to economic pressure
facing the nation. A large factor in how Iran operates in the international environment has to do
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with its sense of honor. If Iranian elites go into a negotiation believing that they are being strongarmed and that their dignity is at stake, then they may be more unwilling to cooperate or
negotiate on good terms. U.S. negotiators and planners may wish to consider playing to the
Iranian sense of honor, emphasizing that participating in negotiations is not disgraceful but
instead righteous. By playing to Iran’s sense of pessimism, pragmatism, and honor, the United
States will have a better framework in which to operate and prepare itself for any future
negotiations with the Islamic Republic.

Post-Breakout Environment
It is imperative that the United States prepare for a possible future breakout. To combat
this threat, the United States will need to have already considered and developed the
contingencies to combat a nuclear Iran and must have the capability in place to meet any threat.
Conventional and pragmatic thinking is likely to be employed by U.S. leadership when tailoring
a deterrence strategy towards Iran, but there are some indicators that strategic culture gives
which will make this process easier.
The Iranian public is likely to have little to no input on the usage of a nuclear weapon, as
the Iranian elite are well-known for not including public opinion in their decisions; especially in
matters of national security.254 Because of this, planners must instead focus upon Iranian
leadership and the cultural values that they possess when developing a response policy. While
there is longstanding stated aversion to the potential employment of nuclear weapons, the Iranian
elite also believes that if it were in their national interest, and to keep the regime alive, such

254

Johnson, 29.
89

usage would be considered rational. To create a tailored policy to address this problem, one must
first understand the instances in which nuclear weapons are more likely to be utilized.
The Iranians have a history of demarcating the illegitimate usage of nuclear weapons,
specifically the fact that indiscriminately targeting cities and population is not moral. Uzi Rubin,
former head of Israel’s Missile Defense Organization, noted that Iran instead seeks to use their
intercontinental missiles to make up for lack of capability in its air force. He states that, “The
Iranians don’t see [nuclear tipped I.C.B.M.s] that way. Missiles are for them what both tactical
and strategic air power are for the West.”255 By building up a vast arsenal with an array of
ranges, the Iranians will be able to saturate an enemy with missiles or use cluster warheads to
take out specific targets.256 Furthermore, improving missiles in terms of range will allow Iran to
spread their missile arsenal out over a wide area within its country, giving their destructive
capability survivability in the case of a preemptive strike by Israel or the United States.257
Even against a nuclear Israel, Iranian conventional missiles with cluster payloads could
cause massive devastation. By targeting and eliminating key industrial portions of Israel
(electrical grid, transportation centers, chemical or nuclear plants, commercial ports, and
technology workplaces), the Iranians could create enough damage with conventional weapons to
provide a deterrent against Israel.
Furthermore, targeting Israeli chemical and nuclear plants would likely result in
devastation similar to a WMD-type outcome, furthering the argument that Iran can employ
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strategic patience in their nuclear program while developing their economy and conventional
ballistic missile and other capabilities in the short term. Uzi further verifies this Iranian strategy
by saying, “for Iran, ballistic missiles are not weapons of last resort. They see them as legitimate
weapons of war to be used in any conflict.”258 Besides, a longer-range ballistic missile would
prove more effective against missile defense systems in the region produced by the United States
and Israel. In 2017, Supreme Leader Khamenei placed limits on the Iranian ballistic missile
program, so that it would only encompass regions in direct proximity with the Middle East.259
One such reason was to showcase its contrast with the North Korean regime, which seeks to use
its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles as a strategic counter to the United States.
Lower yield nuclear weapons (instead of intercontinental ballistic payloads) are better
accepted by the Iranians. Contrary to popular belief, Iran is not likely to use their I.C.B.M.s for a
nuclear payload. Instead, a tactical ability is more palatable for the Iranian leadership. Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s information dump on the Iranian nuclear program
indicated that the Iranians were interested in developing nuclear weapons with yields of 10
kilotons.260 The P.A.S.C.C. report Assessing Prospects for Iranian Compliance with the
J.C.P.O.A. describes the duality of Iran denouncing nuclear weapons and still legitimizing their
usage. The report states that these dual “tracks” or “levels” can be legitimized as, “Iranian
leaders can approve of hypothetical scenarios where nuclear weapons could be used for
defensive purposes against military entities alone while simultaneously decrying the ‘Western
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paradigm’ of warfare, which has a perceived history of targeting civilians and population
centers.”261 This is in line with the Iranian practice of taqiyyah, in which morality designed by
the leadership can circumvent traditional thought in order to allow for the practical usage of a
tool which would ensure the nation’s survival.
These low yield weapons would be likely to be used as a regional deterrent against Israel
or other opponents in proximity, as well as an area denial measure affecting U.S. bases and
influence in the region.262 Iran’s propensity to utilize asymmetric tools of warfare, such as
terrorist networks, may indicate other ways in which a nuclear or radiological weapon could be
used to deter an enemy. As stated by Johnson, the most likely scenario in which Iran would use a
tactical nuclear weapon would be to deter Israel, area denial measures against the United States,
or, “the threat of a land invasion of Iran emanating from the Arab Gulf states.”263 In any event,
the decision to use nuclear weapons would most likely be to ensure the direct survival of the
regime, if conventional Iranian military methods were not able to produce such a result. In line
with Hudson’s assertion that strategic culture can give insight as to what actions, “are on the
shelf,” the knowledge of possible Iranian motivations and thresholds for the use of nuclear
weapons will further assist U.S. policymakers in the formulation of defense strategies to deter
aggression.264
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Policy Option: Combating Terrorism
Due to Iran’s history of using state-sponsored terrorism to carry out attacks, it is highly
likely that Iran might transfer/proliferate nuclear weapons to terrorist networks to achieve
strategic objectives. Because of this, the United States must continue to tailor its defense policy
to address the threat of terrorism. In the National Institute of Public Policy (NIPP) study on
deterring Al-Qaeda, it was determined that standard deterrence values could be utilized against
certain terrorist organizations.265 However, traditional deterrence theories created by Schelling
and Kahn may not apply to all terrorist organizations, because of their asymmetric nature and a
lack of a clear targets and/or critical infrastructure. The NIPP study continues to note that “no
single approach to deterrence is likely to be effective in all cases, given the variation in foes and
contexts.”266
Instead, a mix of options and approaches is likely necessary to effectively deter a terrorist
organization. There are multiple types of policies that can succeed in creating a proper deterrence
against terrorists. One can apply a direct response method similar to Cold War deterrence policy,
but the targets would, of course, be different. Instead of directly targeting terrorist camps and
soldiers, who may not value their lives in the same way that the United States’ civilians and
soldiers do, one can still find others such as, “leaders, financiers, supporters, radical clerics, and
other members of terrorist networks,” who do have such values. Matthew Kroenig, a Senior
Fellow in the Center on National Security at The Atlantic Council, points out the fact that before
9/11, leadership within Al-Qaeda questioned whether or not to strike at the World Trade Center
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and Pentagon in fear of a massive U.S. retaliation despite the candor and acceptance of death
from some of the lower tier members.267
Kroenig also notes the possibility of an indirect response to terrorist organizations. This
policy, in line with third and fourth wave deterrence strategies, seeks to find other things that
terrorists might hold dear. An indirect response could be in the form of targeting terrorist family
members, or ideological interests (ex. holy sites). Even if this response might not be in the form
of Khan’s Lex Talionis with a strike back in kind, an indirect response could be some other style
of punishment such as making their families homeless, taxing loved ones, blocking access for
their loved ones to religious sites, and other countless possibilities.268
Finally, by rejecting terrorists the ability to attack with direct denial, then they may be
less prone to think that they can successfully carry out an operation, because if they fail, it will
weaken their cause.269 Direct denial (also known as tactical denial) involves the providing of
public evidence that a terrorist attack was unsuccessful. Kroenig argues that the success of
terrorism revolves around the public message that is conveyed from an accomplished attack.270 If
attacks are unlikely to succeed, terrorists may be less willing to conduct an operation, because
failed attacks harm their message and ability to instill fear into the public. To do this, the United
States will need to continue improving its intelligence capabilities to become able to detect and
disrupt any action or operation that a terrorist organization attempts to carry out.
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If Iran were to attempt to use terrorist networks to implement a nuclear attack against the
United States homeland, its troops, or its allies, the United States should also include within its
direct denial policy a clear retaliatory stance. Even if Iran were to use covert means to hide their
involvement with an attack, the United States should keep an open policy to retaliate if there is
undeniable evidence that Iran was part of an attack.

Policy Option: Diminishing the Threat of Iranian Usage of Nuclear Weapons
Because of Iran’s cultural consideration that tactical nuclear weapons can be justified
under their code of values, the United States should consider the vigorous investment in missile
defense technologies, primarily those able to operate in the regional theatres. In contrast with the
traditional U.S. thinking on deterrence through the Cold War, missile defenses would prove to be
more stabilizing in this case. By ensuring that the United States can destroy all or most tactical
range nuclear missiles directed at its forces, the imminent collapse and destruction of the Iranian
regime afterward by a U.S. response would be guaranteed. To complete this objective, the United
States will need to create and field a layered defense system consisting of sensors, interceptors,
and a command and control structure which can operate between the different branches of the
U.S. military to ensure the immediate sharing of information and response mechanisms. This
layered defense will entail technologies that will exist on the tactical, regional, and strategic
stages. By employing a variety of sensor and interceptor systems, including those that are sea,
air, satellite, and land-based, the United States will have an enhanced 360 awareness and
response capability that will help ensure the safety of U.S. and allied troops/civilians, as well as
result in the destruction of the Iranian missiles.
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As a secondary, but still priority concern regarding missile defense against Iran, the
United States will need to prepare for the possibility of an Iranian strategic capability which
could target the United States homeland. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood stated
in a Hudson Institute event that the U.S. has considered multiple locations for a third Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) site on the East coast of the United States.271 This additional
location would be a significant enhancement to current U.S. capabilities, e.g. the two GMD sites
located on the West coast of the United States (40 interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska; 4
interceptors at Vandenburg Air Force Base, California), that would focus on the threat of an
Iranian strategic capability.272 Rood noted that while the project is not complete, the groundwork
has been laid out and environmental impact studies completed for each possible location.273

Policy Option: Thinking and Targeting of Leadership
Understanding that Iran’s strategic culture emphasizes its leadership, the United States
must find a unique way to understand its motives in the implementation of any nuclear attack,
and must attempt to hold those individuals at risk. To address this challenge, certain questions
must be answered to tailor deterrence, such as:
What is the Propensity of Iranian Leaders to Utilize Nuclear Weapons? Iranian
leaders are more likely and willing to use nuclear weapons in direct self-defense of the regime,
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or as tools to inhibit access or invasion of critical regional locations (e.g. bases or commerce
zones). Self-defense in this sense is to stop any action that would destroy the regime. While an
eventual strategic counter is not out of the question, Iran’s strategic culture is more likely allow
for the use nuclear weapons in tactical situations.
How Does Iran View Defeat, and to What Extent can it Endure Civilian Sacrifice? If
history serves as a precedent, Iran has the ability to suffer and sustain civilian sacrifice if the
cause fits within its cultural narrative. During the Iran-Iraq War it is estimated that over 1 million
Iranians died, many in the cause for martyrdom.274 This battle for glory and honor had the
possibility to end sooner (which could have saved countless lives), but the narrative around the
idea of sacrifice and martyrdom propelled the conflict onward. When agreeing to the ceasefire as
a result of outside pressures from the international community, Supreme Leader Khomeini
likened it to drinking a cup of poison.275 Iranian leaders justified the end of the conflict, where no
victory was achieved, by employing heroic flexibility, which allowed them to accept a short-term
loss for the long-term survival of its regime.
What Constitutes the Survival of the Regime? The Iranian regime is made up of
multiple branches which operate on dual tracks. This includes a governmental body and a
clerical body, which provides clerical oversight on all decisions the regular government makes.
However the overall framework consists of the Supreme Leader at the top, who has final say on
all policies; the President, whose power is diminished by the constitution because of its emphasis
on Shi’a ideals and oversight; the Assembly of Experts, who are chosen clerics which have final
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say on who is able to run for election in Parliament; the Parliament itself, which is a body of 290
members who draft legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve the country's budget; the
Council of Guardians, a clerical oversight body who deems whether or not laws passed are in
accordance with Islamic Law; the Judiciary, which is the prosecutorial body of the government;
and finally, the National Security and Intelligence Agencies (Standing Army, I.R.G.C., National
Security Council, and Ministry of Intelligence & Security), who are responsible for keeping the
integrity of Iranian borders and all force operations existing outside its borders.276
While extensive, the weak point within the Iranian regime is the clerical branch, who act
as the gatekeepers as to what actions or laws are deemed acceptable by its strategic culture. The
most important of these entities is the Supreme Leader, who is responsible for the, “delineation
and supervision of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran."277 Consistent with Iran’s
strategic culture, the Supreme leader exercises a god-granted authority and has final say on any
policies which emanate from the Iranian government. The bodies most closely associated with
the Supreme Leader are the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians, and the National
Security and Intelligence Agencies. With the addition of the President, the leaders of these
different bodies are the most likely to be the ones that hold together the fabric of Iran’s strategic
culture, as they have final say on all objectives and operations that come forth out of the
legislative and policy arms of the government. In the case of an attack on the United States, these
leaders would be the best targets to threaten and hold hostage with response measures. By having
a demonstrated capability to do so, the U.S. may be able to halt a nuclear attack initiated by Iran.
If that were to fail, then the successful removal of these individuals from power might be enough
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to create a drastic change within Iranian strategic culture…a change in where some of the
reformers within government might have the opportunity to rise up and make significant changes
that pull the society towards a more benign and cooperative position in the region.
In addition to understanding these answers and deciding what the most likely answers
are, in any conflict with Iran, the United States must be able to hold the elite leaders at extreme
threat, as they are the central to the continuation of the current regime and the power structure as
a whole. To hold the leadership hostage, the United States would need to utilize intelligence as
well as a flexible force structure. Intelligence will provide the U.S. policymakers with
information regarding where the Iranian leadership is likely to gather or hide in the event of a
nuclear attack. This actionable intelligence would provide the United States with a more credible
threat to Iranian leadership, and a better chance of successfully striking it.
Additionally, the United States will need to continue modernizing its offensive forces so
that they can be capable of holding the Iranian leadership hostage. Improvements, such as:
accuracy of weapons systems, enhanced bunker-busting capabilities, and adjustable payloads to
limit or increase destruction will provide the United States with more flexibility and credibility in
holding leaders at risk. If Iran truly believes that vital individuals of its regime will not be able to
survive a coordinated United States response to a nuclear attack, then it may influence them to
rethink the circumstances that they would initiate a nuclear conflict.
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CONCLUSION

This report has summarized the argument for how the utilization of strategic culture as a
supplemental tool can assist the tailoring of U.S. deterrence policy towards Iran. Chapter I
described the threat posed by Iran, which has continued to aggressively pursue military
capabilities, project power, and destabilize the region. Modern Iranian animosity for the United
States began with the American and British installation of the Shah in 1953, whose policies
eventually drove Iranians to take part in the Islamic Revolution. Since signing the N.P.T., Iran
has committed numerous violations and safeguard agreements concerning its nuclear program.
Most recently, the United States pulled out of the J.C.P.O.A., a nuclear deal with Iran which
would limit its uranium enrichment capabilities and breakout time in exchange for the alleviation
of sanctions. This pullout occurred around the same time that Israel presented a cache of stolen
Iranian documents outlining an explicit attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in the past with 10
kiloton yields.
In addition to its nuclear ambitions, Iran is also increasing its military capabilities,
making it a worrisome competitor for the United States in the Middle East. Attractive
capabilities to Iran are precision-guided weaponry, warhead miniaturization, and offensive and
cyber capabilities. Most importantly, Iran has pursued a capable missile arsenal consisting of
cruise, S.R.B.M.s, M.R.B.M.s, and S.L.V.s. The testing and fielding of these weapons are
worrisome to the U.S. and its allies in the region, primarily because S.L.V.s are similar to
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the technology could easily be transferred to that capacity
if Iran chose to do so. By mastering these technologies, Iran will become one of the preeminent
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powers in the Middle East and could use its force to control economic chokepoints and act
aggressively towards its neighbors.
Iran is currently the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror and uses terrorist networks to
achieve its goals abroad. The use of such networks gives Iran an asymmetric global reach, and
the ability to further exacerbate tensions in regions of its interest such as Israel and Yemen.
Finally, if Iran were to breakout with a nuclear weapon capability, it is highly likely that other
countries in the region would follow to ensure their own security needs. Leadership within Saudi
Arabia and Turkey have both stated that they would obtain a nuclear weapon if Iran chose to do
so. This proliferation of the Middle East would have the potential to increase great power
competition in the region by countries such as Russia and China, who would wish to support
countries that could further their strategic objectives.
Chapter II explained the creation, evolution, and fallacies of traditional deterrence theory
used by the United States throughout the Cold War. The advent of the atomic age ushered in a
new wave of intellectuals with the goal of preventing nuclear war from occurring, and if it were
to occur, how to win one. In response to the early deterrence theory of the threat of massive
retaliation and overwhelming offensive force, theorists such as Herman Kahn and Thomas
Schelling attempted to solve this problem utilizing a rational actor model in their distinct
theories. Herman Kahn emphasized the need to have a wide range of capabilities that would need
to hold all kinds of enemy targets at risk, as well as air, civil, and missile defense systems which
would limit damage and assure allies that the United States was willing to extend deterrence
overseas. Thomas Schelling’s theory focused on the utilization of M.A.D., which entailed the
prohibition of defensive systems, and the ability to ensure a second-strike capability which
would target an enemy’s urban-industrial complex. Schelling’s theory also claimed that one did
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not need to have a logical deterrent and that instead a “threat that leaves something to chance”
was enough to persuade an enemy to act cautiously in the fog of war. Schelling argued that the
United States could purposefully “rock the boat,” and act brazenly, which would cause an enemy
to stand down in the event of an escalation.
In the end, both theories played an influential role in U.S. Cold War nuclear strategy.
However, it is arguable that Schelling’s theories attained more of a dominant role in the policy
debate due to an attainable, affordable and sufficiently survivable nuclear force, and the greater
possibility of arms control and diplomacy options. As new threats emerged at the end of the Cold
War, theorists noted the fallacies with Schelling and Kahn’s Cold War theories of deterrence.
Both theories emphasize the idea that an enemy will be “rational,” meaning that they are likely to
think about and make decisions the same way that the United States would in a given situation.
However, third wave deterrence intellectuals explored how Kahn and Schelling’s theories would
not hold up in this new environment because many enemies think about rationality differently
than the United States. During this time period, the study of strategic culture developed out of the
need for a new understanding of how other leaders make critical decisions.
Chapter III further explained the nature of strategic culture and how it can be used to
assist policymakers in making informed decisions. Strategic culture is the study of how cultural
values, norms, and perceptions influence how a state makes grand strategic decisions and views
the world. Influences of state’s strategic culture are factors such as its geography, history,
experiences with domestic and outside powers and myths and symbols prevalent throughout a
culture’s narrative. Additionally, elites play an immense role in the shaping of a state’s strategic
culture, as they are the ones typically who control the culture’s narrative and act as the
gatekeepers as to what changes in society are acceptable.
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Jack Snyder was among the first scholars who began to link how strategic culture can
predict state behavior. In his study on Soviet strategic culture, he was able to confirm that the
Soviets were more prone to an offensive and decisive use of force to achieve their objectives due
to cultural factors, which was later confirmed by the Russian doctrine of “escalate to deescalate.”
Kartchner emphasized how strategic culture was essential in playing a role in the
formulation of WMD strategy for three reasons. First, strategic culture can bridge the gap of the
previous lack of understanding the United States had into how opponents make “rational”
decisions. Secondly, strategic culture will let the U.S. “know one’s enemy,” as well as its allies,
which could play an immense part in military planning as well as diplomacy. Thirdly and finally,
state decisions regarding WMD are often justified in cultural terms.
In his framework for analyzing strategic culture, Kartchner noted four subsections of
state WMD decision making that strategic culture can explain. These subsections are the
decisions to adhere to international norms, acquire, proliferate, or use WMDs. Kartchner further
described the model of three dispositions that must first be justified within a state’s strategic
culture that would allow them to make these decisions. First, an action must be deemed
“rational,” within a culture, meaning that the cost and benefits of an action are deemed
acceptable or bearable. Secondly, an action concerning WMD must be seen by the holders of a
strategic culture as enabling the group, organization, or state to achieve culturally endorsed
outcomes.”278 Finally, the ends and means of any WMD decision must be within the “repertoire
or palette” emanating from a state’s culture. By using this framework, one is better able to use
strategic culture as a tool in formulating WMD policy against an opponent.
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Chapter IV provided insight into what constitutes Iran’s strategic culture, by analyzing its
relevant history, how it identifies itself, the dominant cultural values in its society, the norms that
characterize its behavior, and how it makes decisions based upon its cultural values regarding
WMD. As a society which has been around for thousands of years, Iran has a vibrant and distinct
strategic culture. Throughout this history, values such as absolute kingship and rule of the
jurisprudent have been consistent within Iranian society dating back to the Achaemenid Persian
Empire of Cyrus the Great. The rise and fall of other empires in the region added to the broad
sense of insecurity felt by Iranians, who believed that these empires would try and instill outside
values within their society. However, Iranians were able to keep a cohesive national identity by
lending their existing bureaucracies to conquerors, in exchange for keeping local laws and
customs.
The next transformation in Iranian history was the establishment of Islam within the
Middle East. During this time, the great schism of Islam occurred, concerning the successor of
the Prophet Muhammed. Those who believed that the leader of the faith should be his bloodline
successor were the Shi’a and mainly took up residence within the Iranian region. With the death
of Muhammed’s brother in law Ali, the reverence for martyrdom cemented itself into the Iranian
identity. Shi’a Islam would eventually play a significant governing role within Iran in the 16th
century. From this time onwards, further foreign intervention from outside powers such as the
Ottomans, Indians, Russians, and other Muslim and Western powers would place geopolitical
strains on Iran, by seeking to place it within their spheres of influence. These influences would
further worsen Iranian paranoia. In 1979 the modern Iranian regime was born out of the Islamic
revolution, which deposed the Shah and instead placed an Ayatollah as the Supreme Leader of
the Republic.
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The Iranian Identity is self-defined as a global protector of Shi’a Islam and distrust
towards the outside world. Iran’s extensive history gives itself the perception as a great and
important nation, responsible for much of the world’s scientific achievement. Iran uses Shi’a
ideology to model its society, utilizing its caste system (reminiscent of the ancient Sassanian
empire), the recognition of an absolute ruler, and the rule of clerical oversight for government
decisions. Finally, Iran’s self-described enemies are the United States (for its involvement with
imposing the Shah), Israel, and the Sunni Muslim powers surrounding it.
Iranian values can be observed using the Hofstede 6-D model, which uses a cultural
framework to establish a country’s Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty
Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, and Indulgence. This scale indicates that Iran has a large
power distance between its elites and its people; is a collectivist society; is characterized as a
society which focuses on quality of life instead of internal competition; has a high penchant for
uncertainty avoidance; views societal change with distrust; and scores low on indulgence,
indicating that it is more prone to pessimism and cynicism.
Iranian norms focus on how the country behaves and relates to conflict, the international
system, the utility of violence, and the laws of war. Nima Baghdadi in the P.A.S.C.C. report on
Iranian compliance with the J.C.P.O.A. concluded that three cultural orientation played a
significant role in Iranian behavior; pessimism, pragmatism, and honor.
Finally, Iran’s strategic culture can give indicators as to how it makes decisions regarding
WMDs. While initially opposing the use of WMDs due to Islamic beliefs, it was eventually able
to be rationalized using the concept of taqiyyah, where traditional concepts or taboos can be
pushed aside if it will ensure the survival of the regime. Iran is prone to break with international
norms, justify the acquisition of WMD, transfer or proliferate WMD technology to organizations
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as a way to increase its asymmetric capabilities, and use WMD either as the means to establish a
deterrent, defend the regime from strategic defeat, or as a tactical capability.
Chapter V then discussed how the U.S. could use the knowledge of Iran’s strategic
culture to tailor a deterrence policy towards it. U.S. policymakers will need to consider two
environments in which a tailored deterrence policy will operate. One in which Iran has still not
acquired a nuclear weapon, and one environment in which it does.
In the pre-breakout environment, there is the possibility to influence Iranian leadership by
exacerbating tensions within the civilian population. Even with the financial considerations given
to Iran through the J.C.P.O.A., its economy is still weak and there is a high amount of
unemployment and poverty through the country. Instead of using the financial gains from the
J.C.P.O.A. to fix the problems within their country, the Iranian elite instead chose to further
build up their military, missile arsenal, and involvement in foreign theatres. By imposing a strict
sanctions regime upon Iran, the United States will be able to make the Iranian populace break
from their norms of accepting all policies that the elites formulate, and instead place more
pressure upon them, initiating a change.
Furthermore, strategic culture can give U.S. policymakers further insight into Iranian
negotiating behavior if another nuclear deal is constructed. Because Iran is a pessimistic nation,
it is likely to view any attempt by the United States to strike a deal with distrust. Because of this,
if future deals provide Iran with financial concessions, they are likely to be used to enhance its
power within the region. To address this, the U.S. will need to ensure that there is a strict
verification process within any deal so that even with Iranian distrust, there could be no instance
where they could cheat or misuse funds.
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In the post-breakout environment, the United States will need to address three separate
challenges. The first is to combat Iranian use of terrorism. Because Iran is more likely to transfer
WMD technologies to terrorist organizations, the United States will need to utilize strategies
such as direct and indirect responses, as well as direct denial. Furthermore, by establishing a
retaliatory policy that holds Iran responsible if it is discovered that it sponsored a terrorist attack,
the U.S. is more likely to persuade Iran to not use such methods in the first place.
Secondly is the need for the U.S. to diminish the effect of an Iranian nuclear attack. It is
believed that Iran is more likely to use a tactical ballistic missile in the event of conflict279. To
deter Iran, the United States will need to ensure Iran that any attack it makes upon the U.S., its
forces, and its allies will not succeed. To accomplish this, the U.S. will need to invest in missile
defense technologies vigorously. Completion of this policy will include a layered defense of
tactical, regional, and strategic sensors and interceptors, and the inclusion of a third GMD
missile defense site on the Eastern Coast of the United States. If Iran is assured that it will not be
able to use nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives, then it is more likely to be deterred.
Finally, because the Iranian elite constitutes the regime, controls all policy decisions, and
is willing to endure large numbers of civilian deaths, the United States will need the capability to
hold these leaders hostage and understand their decision-making. By understanding how the
Iranian government is structured, U.S. policymakers can target those within the regime who are
most closely linked to the grand policy decisions down the chain of command, mostly within the
clerical branch. By modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces to hold these leaders hostage
reliably, the United States will further be able to assure Iran that its regime would not survive in
the wake of a nuclear attack.
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Strategic culture is not simply the basis to formulate primary nuclear policy options, but
is rather a means for making a calculated argument for or against U.S. decisions. There are many
historic precedents illustrating that a lack of understanding into an opponent’s thinking or modus
operandi can lead to miscalculation, unnecessary or ill-advised conflict, and related negative
consequences. As a tool to be employed in the development of U.S. policy, strategic culture can
serve as a viable element to either affirm or discourage the nation’s leadership from taking
particular actions. It provides further data and insights regarding the likely reactions of
opponents, and therefore illuminates the possible outcomes and chances of success or failure.
When utilizing strategic culture as a tool, it is beneficial to start with an examination of
historical and current cultural studies, and compare them with a policy case study (e.g. an
examination of a recent conflict) to see if there is a direct connection between a nation’s cultural
values, norms, and identities vis-à-vis the decisions made and actions taken in the event
examined in the policy case study. Kartchner describes the focus of this research as, “the link
between strategic culture and the specific national security missions of assure, dissuade, deter,
and defeat.”280 If there is a correlation between these cultural influences and policy case studies,
then it may help further convince U.S. policymakers that strategic culture can serve an immense
purpose as a tool for deterrence policy.
As Isaac Newton once wrote, “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of
giants.”281 So too it is the imperative of those in the national defense and foreign policy arenas to
understand the evolution of American deterrence policy, and the research already undertaken,
and build upon it. The world is becoming ever more complex, and as such, the United States will
280
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need to have even more nuanced insights into the motivations and likely actions of friends and
opponents when seeking to provide for the security and prosperity of the nation. It is in this
realm that strategic culture can be of true benefit. By striving to better understand the nature and
cultural drivers of mankind and its leaders, the United States can more effectively respond to any
situation, and make the most appropriate decisions to benefit the welfare of its citizens.
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